Tuesday, 24 November 2015

The Platonic Theory of Being



[This is an extract from the chapter 'The Platonic Theory of Being', published in The Sacred History of Being on November 2, 2015]

.....The context of this passage is an attempt to explain water and air as intermediary between fire and earth, but what Plato is giving us is more general: a theory of participation which has been the root of the western tradition in art and architecture ever since:

For whenever the middle term of any three numbers, cubic or square, is such that as the first term is to it, so is it to the last term - and again, conversely, as the last term is to the middle, so is the middle to the first.

- then the middle term becomes in turn the first and the last, while the first and last become in turn middle terms, and the necessary consequence will be that all the terms are interchangeable, and being interchangeable they all form a unity.  [i]

Why is it a necessary consequence that all the terms are interchangeable? Each of the terms bears a relation to the others, a proportionate similitude, and each can become first, middle and last terms in an extended sequence, but they are not the same as each other. They are conjoined with one another, but in sequence. They bear likeness to each other in the proper sequential order but not otherwise. It depends on the arrangement. Given the proper arrangement, one may pass through the sequence and establish degrees of similitude between all the different terms. But they are still not the same. They participate in each other, but their proportionate similitude is not identity, and that is essentially what Plato is claiming here.

I think that there is no doubt that this is what Plato means, and it is up to us to explain it. Clearly it underpins the description of the activity of the philosopher in the Republic, where it is said that the process of argument:

...treats assumptions not as principles, but as assumptions in the true sense, that is, as starting points and steps in the ascent to something which involves no assumption and is the first principle of everything; when it has grasped that principle it can again descend, by keeping to the consequences that follow from it, to a conclusion. The whole procedure involves nothing in the sensible world but moves solely through forms to forms, and finishes with forms.  [ii]

What Plato is arguing is that, by systematic dialectical enquiry, we can rise from the realms of likelihood and opinion, where we encounter only similitudes, to the realm in which certain knowledge is possible. This is to be achieved by passing through the similitudes, on account of their similitude, to their ultimate origin, the Form of the Good.

In a sense the Platonic dialogues can be understood in this way - as excursions from selected assumptions - and the Republic and the Timaeus illustrate this very well - both employ series of images, of likelihoods which are to be understood as metaphors or similitudes of the general notion which is to be grasped. We are to reject the accounts of the making of the universe in the Timaeus, on the grounds that these accounts possess merely likelihood, and no more. The general notion or the ultimate reality behind the accounts is not to be grasped by collation of the versions, but by an altogether more mysterious process of induction....
[End of chapter extract]




[i] Tim 31c-32a
[ii] Rep. 511b-c





Monday, 23 November 2015

The Ontological Argument in Descartes

[This is an extract from a chapter in The Sacred History of Being, published November 2, 2015]


The argument developed by Descartes differs from Anselm’s in a number of respects. He avoids the term ‘great’ (and notes the fact in the course of his argument). Instead he uses the concept ‘perfect’, so that God is described as the ‘supremely perfect Being’. He also uses variations on the phrase ‘clearly and distinctly’ in connection with his apprehension of the idea of God. [i]

If just because I can draw the idea of something from my thought, it follows that all which I know clearly and distinctly as pertaining to this object does really belong to it, may I not derive from this an argument demonstrating the existence of God? It is certain that I no less find the idea of God, that is to say, the idea of a supremely perfect Being, in me, than that of any figure or number whatever it is; and I do not know any less clearly and distinctly that an actual and eternal existence pertains to this nature than I know that all that which I am able to demonstrate of some figure or number truly pertains to the nature of this figure or number, and therefore, although all that I concluded in the preceding Meditations were found to be false, the existence of God would pass with me as at least as certain as I have ever held the truths of mathematics to be.

To paraphrase: ‘If it follows that an idea in thought can be expressed, and all I know clearly and distinctly about it,  is the case, then may I not use this as the basis of an argument to prove the reality of God?’ He finds the idea of a ‘supremely perfect Being’ as real within himself as ideas of geometric figures, and numbers. He does not know any less clearly and distinctly that actual and eternal existence is a property of the supreme perfect Being, than he knows all which he can demonstrate in relation to geometrical figures or a number truly comprises the properties of these. And were everything else in the preceding Meditations to be found false, the reality of God would be as real for Descartes as he ever held the truths of mathematics to be.

However clear and distinct is Descartes idea of a ‘supremely perfect Being’, and that this idea can be expressed, it does not follow that it can be used as the basis of an argument to prove the reality of God. To follow his analogy, his knowledge of the properties of geometrical figures and numbers, may be extensive and even comprehensive, but it does not follow that his knowledge of these properties is complete. The properties of which he knows are just that. It is obvious that it is easier to circumscribe the properties and characteristics of geometrical figures and numbers than to have a clear and distinct idea of the properties and nature of a ‘supremely perfect Being’. What Descartes can have in his mind is a ‘notion’ of the properties and nature of such a perfect Being. He might think that the reality of God, the existence of God is at least as real as the truths of mathematics; this is a notion only, rather than something which can be established.

This indeed is not at first manifest, since it would seem to present some appearance of being a sophism. For being accustomed in all other things to make a distinction between existence and essence, I easily persuade myself that the existence can be separated from the essence of God, and that we can thus conceive God as not actually existing. But, nevertheless, when I think of it with more attention, I clearly see that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than can its having its three angles equal to two right angles be separated from the essence of a rectilinear triangle, or the idea of a mountain from the idea of a valley; and so there is not any less repugnance to our conceiving a God (that is, a Being supremely perfect) to whom existence is lacking (that is to say, to whom a certain perfection is lacking), than to conceive of a mountain which has no valley.

Descartes defends himself against the possible charge that his argument is sophistry. He can ordinarily distinguish between the existence and the essence of something. And so he can easily persuade himself that the property ‘existence’ can be separated from the ‘essence’ of God. And thus that we can conceive of God as not possessing the property of something which exists. This however he says is the result of inattentive thinking, and more attention to the question allows him to clearly see that the existence of God cannot be separated from the essence of God any more than the properties of a right-angled triangle can be separated from the essence of it. Or any more than that the idea of a mountain can be separated from the idea of a valley. So the repugnance of the idea of conceiving a supremely perfect Being without the property of existence is no less than to conceive of a mountain without a valley.

The problem here is the conception of existence as a form or mode of perfection. In antiquity this equation would not have been made – rather the nature and properties of divinity would have been drawn in contrast with those of existence. There are many ways to express this difference – the secular world has existence, the world of coming-to-be and passing-away has existence, man has existence, the world of things and of representation has existence. The Divine and the eternal did not have existence in the same way in the ancient world. The world of reality was understood to be separate in essence from the secular world; this separate reality was the realm of the divine, and so existence would not be a property of the divine, even if the divine was (as it generally was) considered to be completely real. This is not to say that the divine could not manifest or act in the world of existence; but that existence is a species of imperfection, with which the divine could be (and was) contrasted. Descartes cannot mean that God is real in the sense of having a presence in the material world. And it is curious that later he treated God as if he was walled up in his own sphere. This was necessary to promote the idea that one could do mathematics without reference to God, and without concern that God would interfere with the purely mathematical workings of the world. 

But although I cannot really conceive of a God without existence any more than a mountain without a valley, still from the fact that I conceive of a mountain with a valley, it does not follow that there is such a mountain in the world; similarly although I conceive of God as possessing existence, it would seem that it does not follow that there is a God which exists; for my thought does not impose any necessity upon things, and just as I may imagine a winged horse, although no horse with wings exists, so I could perhaps attribute existence to God, although no God existed.

Here, Descartes concedes that though he can conceive of the supreme perfect Being as possessing existence, it does not necessarily follow that there is a God which exists, since his thought ‘does not impose any necessity upon things’. What he means by this is that the reality or otherwise or god is not dependent on his understanding of the nature of God.’ So Descartes might be attributing the property of existence to God, even if no God existed.
[End of extract]




[i] Descartes, Rene, third Meditation. In The Philosophical Works of Descartes, Volume I, translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross.

Saturday, 7 November 2015

Why read The Sacred History of Being?




Why should you read The Sacred History of Being?  Our current cultural space has been shaped by a huge number of developments which took place in the past. These developments stretch back to the origins of civilization, and so we are shaped by several millennia of intellectual and political struggles, changes in patterns of thought and language, and economic and physical invention.

So where we are might have turned out to be a very different place. Things are always in flux, and change so fast that we can see the process happening in the present – the world I grew up in has passed away, and very few of the things I was taught in order to equip me for life as an adult have turned out to be of any use. For example, I was taught to count in binary, aged eight, because the future was going to be a world filled with computers and computing. To do computing (then) meant the necessity of understanding and using binary notation.

It seemed like a good decision at the time. But the future is notoriously difficult to predict. We feel on surer ground when we look at the past, because the past is where real things happened, and we can know about those things. Those things do not change.

However our perception of them, and our knowledge of them, does change. Everything we think we know  colours our understanding of our past. So in a sense, our present is the result of what we think got us to this place. We are carrying a great deal of baggage, and much of it in practice is, like our understanding of the past, negotiable.

The Sacred History of Being is a book about our intellectual past. But it is also a book which also explores some aspects of how we came to think in the way we do about the earliest days of civilization.

Views of remote antiquity at the start of the 20th century were very different from those at the close of the century. The past can never be done and dusted in our understanding. But it is easy for scholars to think that we are refining our understanding of antiquity, and that we are, mainly by dint of massive advances in the sciences, able to be more objective and precise in our understanding. Archaeology has made huge strides over many decades, and we understand ancient languages which were entirely lost until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Our capacity to date objects allows us a sense of perspective our ancestors did not have, and as a consequence we can arrange events in space and time with hitherto unheard of accuracy. We create typologies, we periodise, and we frame and reframe.

All of this however, is taking place within a changing series of assumptions about the past, many of which are not subject to endless re-examination and reframing. If these assumptions are false, to whatever degree, the refinement of our understanding of the past is the refinement of an essentially fictitious picture.

The Sacred History of Being is about unpicking some of the key fictions which distort our understanding of the past.  

The main issues addressed by the book are:

The long standing effort by western scholars to utterly separate the patterns of thought of the east from those of the modern west. This has been underway since the Enlightenment, and to a large extent builds on the medieval understanding of Aristotle, and the logical apparatus he created.

The Ontological Argument, developed in the early modern period, building on arguments first mooted by St Anselm. The argument was promoted by eminent philosophers, including Descartes and Leibniz. The argument is supposed to provide a form of proof of the existence of God. The argument presumes some things which it ought to seek to explain, such as the framework of existence within which God is ‘proved’ to have existence. This mode of argument has been extremely damaging for our understanding of thought in antiquity. Plato did not argue like this, and nor did Aristotle.

Plato on the Divine and the nature of Reality. Because of the adoption of the Ontological Argument as a proof of the existence of God, there has been little attention given to Plato’s discussion of the reality of the Divine, and what it means. Much of the interest in Plato as a philosopher over the past two centuries has focussed on the question of whether or not he was engaged in research, or was otherwise teaching traditional doctrine. Much technical ingenuity has been wasted on this dispute, including the development of stylometry, devised in order to detect the order in which Plato’s dialogues were composed. The idea being if we could know this order, we could better understand the apparent changes of view, and know if he was engaged in research over his long lifetime. Those who argue that he was teaching traditional doctrine have had a very difficult time of it, since, as they admit, they have no idea what that traditional doctrine might be.

Plato’s idea of the Divine is not discussed by him as a piece of formal argument. But the details of such an argument are present in some of the key dialogues. These details have not been properly assembled by scholars because of the intellectual baggage they bring to bear on the question. The scholars  are looking for something which will make sense within the intellectual world which developed after Plato. Which is the intellectual world of the west.  It does make sense however within the kind of intellectual understanding of reality which was always current in the east, and in some places still is. The difference here between east and west, is that the east does not presume the existence of space and time apart from the reality of the Divine. When Plato is speaking of God, he is speaking of Reality itself, which is beyond space and time.  Plato’s doctrine is decoded in The Sacred History of Being.

The age of philosophy. The consensus view of historians of philosophy is that philosophy was invented by the Greeks, and as an essentially autocthonous development, uninfluenced by other cultures around the Mediterranean and the Near East. Despite the fact that Plato himself claimed that philosophy was very old. Plato and Aristotle were the first writers to write and publish extensive examples of abstract argument: To historians this is generally understood to indicate that they were the first to seriously engage with abstract thought. 

It can now be shown that abstract thought is very old. But historians of human culture have to tip-toe around the philosophers and classicists insistence that before the classical period, nobody engaged in the practice of philosophy, and abstract thought was probably then beyond human capacity. Even if the Greeks themselves said the Egyptians were philosophers (The Egyptians were another casualty of the Enlightenment enthusiasm for locating the origins of philosophy in mid-1st millennium B.C.E. Greece).

How old is Pythagorean philosophy? Older than Plato, certainly, dating apparently to the late sixth century. Pythagoras did not write, but some of his followers did – principally Philolaus, who published three books, which are said to have been sought by Plato. Several writers have written about some of the core doctrines. One of these, the doctrine of Totalities, Pythagoras is said to have learned about in Babylon, about the time of its fall in 539 B.C.E.  Plato writes about it. Porphyry writes about it much, much later. However it is clearly the explanatory mechanism for a passage in Bk XVIII of the Iliad in connection with Hephaestus. So, it is early, precedes Pythagoras, and it surfaces obliquely but unmistakeably in a piece of classic Greek literature from several centuries earlier. It may be however that Pythagoras did learn it in Babylon. But then, that would suggest that the doctrine of Totalities was not Greek. It isn’t.

The  understanding of the doctrine of Totalities underpins Mesopotamian  religious thought. The Sacred History of Being examines a number of key features of ancient civilization, including ideas shared by Greece and Mesopotamia. The Enuma Elish for example contains reference to ideas relating to the gods which were also shared in Greece. The arrangement of the gods and their names in that document clearly shows the practice of collection and division, which is the foundation of Greek philosophy. Otherwise known as the practice of dialectic. Ideas of Ocean are also explored in both civilisations.

Ideas of abstract Divinity in Israel. The Sacred History of Being argues that the historical development of monotheism in Israel should be understood in terms of a protracted philosophical dispute about the nature of the Divine, amidst a vicious hegemonic power struggle in Israel. The  chapter is called ‘The Idea of Being in Israel’. The case is clear: there are philosophical aspects to Yahweh. He is beyond representation because he is that which is, and he does not change. Like Plato’s God, he has no shape, form or colour. He is one, not many. The history of aniconism and opposition to idolatry in Israel stems from this intellectual struggle to engage with the god who is wholly transcendent, and therefore identical with Reality itself.

As a consequence of the known redactions of Biblical texts after the Babylonian exile, we find we know nothing certain about cultic activity in Israel for the half millennium before the return from exile. Except that representations were not always reviled.

Which leads on to the next subject, which is the relationship between the Jewish Kabbalah of the late middle ages, and the Assyrian Sacred Tree. The Assyriologist Simo Parpola showed the essential identity of both concepts in 1993. It used to be assumed that the Kabbalistic Tree owed something to Gnostic belief in the early 1st millennium C.E., and so the fact that it enshrined an abstract idea of Divinity was not a problem for the history of philosophy. If it is also related to the Assyrian sacred tree however, which has archaeological evidence supporting its presence in the mid-second millennium, then the assumption that abstraction was beyond human beings in the middle of the 2nd millennium B.C.E. falls to pieces. Parpola’s argument is discussed in the course of the text.

The argument which was used to support the idea of a deity beyond shape, form, or colour in the middle of the 2nd millennium B.C.E. was not the ontological argument of our middle ages, but was essentially similar to Plato’s argument in the Classical period. Which explodes the notion that the Greeks invented philosophy: the Assyrians were there first.

The Logic of Idolatry. It used to be the case that Idolatry was seen as a stage of cultic worship which preceded monotheism, and had no connection with it. But it is clear from the evidence that this was not the understanding in ancient Mesopotamia (as it is not the understanding now in contemporary Hindu culture in India). The garniture of the universe, as described by the prophet Enoch, was understood to be the creation of God. But he argued that particular instances and images could  mislead people as to the true nature of God. This was part of the Hebrew assault on other gods. We absorbed this view of idolatry at a very early time in western intellectual history, and have not subjected it to any significant amount of rational or critical analysis.  

Idolatry in the 2nd and 1st millennium B.C.E. used images as part of a chain of abstractions to lead supplicants to the transcendent god, as Plato described in his ‘literary fiction’ about the Forms. It was an intellectual discipline, which has been wholly lost. The importance of these images stemmed from the fact that the supreme deity was ultimately beyond all form and representation.  It was a discipline designed to allow the supplicant to approach transcendent deity.

Ten good reasons to read The Sacred History of Being. Many more questions are explored along the way. The thesis of the book is radical, thought-provoking, properly documented, and offers fresh perspectives on the past. Though all of it is of scholarly interest, the book is clearly written, makes few concessions to scholarly jargon, and is aimed at an interested lay audience.

Further details can be found on the static page for The Sacred History of Being, plus links to some freely available extracts from the text. Some reader responses to the book can be found here.


Thomas Yaeger, November 7, 2015. Text revised March 3, July 26, 2016, August 8, and August 12, 2017. Text revised October 18, 2017. Updated December 31, 2017.


Friday, 30 October 2015

Full Chapter List for The Sacred History of Being

This is the full chapter list for the edition of The Sacred History of Being, published on November 2, 2015. The preface is available to read on the Kobo platform, using the preview feature. 


Contents of The Sacred History of Being:

Preface.

Part One.

A Sense of the Past.
How old is Philosophy?
The Arrival of the Idea of Being.
The West and the Other.
The Golem.
Change and what is Permanent.
The Ontological Argument.
The Ontological Argument in Anselm.
The Ontological Argument in Descartes.
The Nature of Reality in Berkeley.
Hume and Kant on Reality.
The End of the Ontological Argument.

Part Two.

The Sweet Song of Swans.
The Academy.
The Platonic Theory of Being.
Plato’s Theory of Vision.
The Paradox of Knowledge.
Eleven attributes of Being.
Pythagoras and Totality.
Solon in the court of Croesus.
The Complexion of the Dead.
Being in Homer.

Part Three.

Ocean and the Limit of Existence.
Creation.
The Fifty names of Marduk.
The Idea of Being in Israel.
Understanding Creation as a Sacred Tree.
Being, Kabbalah, and the Assyrian Sacred Tree.
The Making and the Renewal of the Gods.
The Ritual sequence and its purpose.
The Nineveh ritual.
The Babylonian ritual.
Finding the Name of the Sacred Tree.
Postscript.

Appendices.

Thomas Taylor on the Ineffable principle.
Oannes and the Instruction of Mankind.
Ashurbanipal on the exercise of Kingship.
Select Bibliography.
Abbreviations