Showing posts with label Greece. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Greece. Show all posts

Wednesday, 23 December 2020

The Wider Scope of Ancient Mathematics (letter to an American Scholar)

 


Avebury Circle, photographed in 2001

Dear....., 


Hi. I became aware of your short book [.......................]  relatively recently. I wish I’d known it earlier.

I have a strong interest in the idea and function of the concept of limit in antiquity. My main object of study at UCL was ancient  Assyria (mostly the text corpus). Like the Greeks, they had a strong interest in the idea of limit, which is illustrated on the walls of their buildings, and is also represented in their images of the sacred tree. Limit also serves an important function in setting up their gods in heaven (I’ve written about both Assyrian and Babylonian rituals for this).

This tells us something of the actual basis of Mesopotamian religion, which has an origin which is quite different from what we imagine. 

Essentially ancient religions are transcendentalist in nature. In other words, they have their origins in a focus on abstract conceptions (limit, infinity, infinite series,completion, totality, etc). Which makes a nonsense of the idea that the Greeks were the first to grapple with sophisticated abstract thought. Clement of Alexandria created a list of civilizations which practised philosophy, and added the Greeks as the* last* to adopt the practice of philosophy.

Since you might be interested in the wider scope of ancient mathematics, I am writing to you to point you at a couple of articles which illustrate that these concerns were a feature of building projects in Neolithic Britain also. The Horus numbers are there, as the basis of establishing Euler’s number via a geometric construction. Euler’s number being the final result of a convergent infinite series.

Did they get their mathematics from Egypt, or did they develop them themselves? I have no idea. Why Euler’s number? It’s a mathematical stand-in for the extreme limit, which is infinity.


‘At Reality’s Edge’

https://shrineinthesea.blogspot.com/2020/12/at-realitys-edge.html?spref=tw%20%20# (Short article)

‘The Mathematical Origins of the Megalithic Yard’

http://shrineinthesea.blogspot.com/2020/02/the-mathematical-origins-of-megalithic.html (Long  article)

Best regards,

 

Thomas Yaeger

Tuesday, 24 November 2020

The Prisoners in the Cave

 @SemprePhi drew my attention to the following book review on the 23rd November:

Phillip Sidney Horky, Plato and Pythagoreanism 2013. Reviewed by Simon TrĂ©panier bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2014/2014-05-1… #brynmawr #philosophy

I responded in four short posts, which I’ve now augmented with further discussion.

@SemprePhi Hi. Thanks for the pointer to Horky's book and the review. Where to start! You cannot rely on Aristotle for accurate information about the Pythagoreans. Huffman has been occupying academic space for thirty years, and won't cross the boundaries. 1/

Note the whole argument is based on the idea that philosophy in Greece is an autocthonous development. Not invented elsewhere. I've shown that Pythagoras derived many of his ideas from Mesopotamia. And that these influences are reflected in Plato. They just don't want to see. 2/

Or they fear to step outside the accepted paradigm for fear of committing heresy, and having to pay for their sin. There is much information about what Pythagoras brought back from the east in Greek writing. But scholars don't know what it is, and why [it] is important. 3/

In order to stay within the acceptable paradigm, or 'episteme', they don't read the full range of sources which are available. Consequently it is difficult to make sense of the sources that they do read. If you read the full range of sources, it is an eye-opener. 4/

Philosophers and Historians are nervous about crossing the boundaries of their subjects, not just because of the risk to their reputations. They are happiest when sense can be made of what they are looking at. That sense isn’t always the sense that things made in antiquity. Modern scholars make fictions, and sit upon the pile they have made.

The philosopher Adrian Moore wrote a history of the infinite in 1990, and presented a series on BBC radio in 2016 on the same subject. Both discuss the problems and issues around the human response to the idea of the infinite. However Moore’s idea of the history of man’s relationship is strangely structured. Writing about the broadcast series I pointed out that:

We  get many clues about the Greek understanding of the infinite and the unlimited from a number of Plato’s dialogues, including The TimaeusThe SophistThe RepublicThe TheaetetusThe Laws, and The Parmenides. In skipping Plato, the first reference to Parmenides and his notion of the universe as simply one and one alone, is as an introduction in the first episode to his pupil Zeno of Elea, and his response to paradox. There is no discussion of Plato’s demolition of Parmenides arguments, no discussion of the Platonic forms, no discussion of the relationship of the forms to the form of the Good, which is another way of talking about what is infinite, and no discussion of what amounts to a different logical modality in the pages of Plato (where he discusses things passing into one another by means of their similitude), which is a way of understanding the relationship of finite things to the infinite.  

What Moore has constructed is a Catholic perspective on the idea of the infinite, since it is viewed from the perspective of Thomas Aquinas and Bishop Anselm. What made sense to those scholars, makes sense to Moore. Plato was largely unavailable to any scholars  of that period (with the exception of some sections of the Timaeus). But to write now about the infinite as if the writings of Plato are unknown to us, or of no importance to our understanding of the human response to the infinite, is difficult to fathom. I summarised part of this first episode of the series as follows:

Essentially Aristotle’s rapprochement, which Moore characterises as an attempt to make the concept of the infinite more palatable to the Greeks, involved dividing the idea of the infinite into two. As already mentioned, one of these was the potential infinite, and the second was the actual infinite. As outlined in the first episode, Zeno’s paradoxes depended on the idea of an infinite divisibility, which seemed to make the idea of any kind of movement impossible, since that would require a universe of infinite complexity. Zeno therefore regarded all forms of movement as illusion. Since in order to travel a certain distance, you would have to travel half the distance to your destination, and then half of the distance remaining, and then half of that, and half of what still remained, and so on. Which would result in an infinite number of steps. Which would be impossible. 

Aristotle’s response was that though the various stages of the journey could be understood in such a way, the stages were not marked, and did not have to be considered in making a journey. The idea of limit is however a crucial point. What Aristotle was saying is that there are two ways of looking at the idea of what a limit is.  Essentially there is limitation which is defined by what a thing is, and there is limitation which is not. In the first case the limit of a thing cannot be transcended without the nature of that thing turning into something else.

The essence of this argument is that there are forms of limit which can be ignored. One of which is the actual infinite: instead we should deal with the potential infinite. The actual infinite, by its nature, is always there. But we cannot deal with it. The potential infinite we can work with, since it is not always there, and spread infinitely through reality. So we can count numbers without ever arriving at infinity, or ever being in danger of arriving there. Moore mentioned that this conception of infinity more or less became an orthodoxy after Aristotle, though not everyone accepted that his argument against actual infinity was solid. Which is something of an understatement. Aristotle’s distinction between the potential infinite and the actual infinite is between what is, in practical terms, something we can treat as finite, and what is actually infinite. 

 

Moore has defined himself as an Aristotelian finitist, meaning that, since (he argues), man cannot deal with the actual infinite, only the potential infinite can make any sense to us. And so, much ancient discussion is swept away, as of very little interest or importance. This is why we cannot easily understand much of the intellectual world of antiquity. Instead we choose to write unflattering fictions about it.

I said that we cannot rely on Aristotle for accurate information on the Pythagoreans. This is not because I regard him as a poor scholar. Both Plato and Aristotle taught in the Academy in Athens. They were both dealing with a body of traditional doctrine (there are many passages where a comparison shows this – their discussion of the importance of the liver, for example). But they had quite different ways of discussing doctrine. Plato gives the reader real information about the subject, but hedges it about with other arguments, and sometimes talks in terms of images and myth (the account of the prisoners in the cave, in the Republic, for example). So his work makes sense to those who already know the doctrine, and intrigues those who don’t. Aristotle on the other hand, seems to have had the job of sifting through students to find those who might have the intelligence to  be able to grasp the essence of the doctrine (when properly instructed). He did this sometimes by constructing complex sophistical arguments which actually contradicted doctrine, and sometimes even rational sense.

Two examples: The first is Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, originally a series of lectures, ends up concluding the gods cannot act in the world, but only contemplate. Imagine the response to that argument in the ancient world! Why did Aristotle argue like this? He was looking for students who could provide critical rational responses to the argument, and who could  see that it did not make any sense in a reality which was (at the time) populated by divinities expected to play a constructive role in the world. The second example is Aristotle’s comments on logical modality (mostly in the Metaphysics), which I’ve discussed elsewhere (in ‘Logical Modality in Classical Athens’). This also contradicts traditional doctrine which underpinned the human relationship with the divine. And not just in Greece. Plato discusses the logical modality which enables contact and engagement with the divine, and other authors do too. We ignore all of this information concerning doctrine, because we prefer the unfathomable shadows on the wall.

However, despite the occasional tricksiness of Aristotle, he tells us something important, which, if we are familiar with relevant texts by other authors, we can figure out. I quote again from my critical review of Adrian Moore’s broadcast History of the Infinite, concerning the arguments of Zeno:.

The idea of limit is however a crucial point. What Aristotle was saying is that there are two ways of looking at the idea of what a limit is.  Essentially there is limitation which is defined by what a thing is, and there is limitation which is not. In the first case the limit of a thing cannot be transcended without the nature of that thing turning into something else.

Aristotle’s discussion references the doctrinal view which is also discussed by Plato. Which is that there is an important connection between the idea of limit and the infinite. The infinite is just another way of specifying what is unlimited, and beyond the physical world. Paradoxically, it is the actual limit of what is, and what can be. This does not represent a retreat from commerce with the actual infinite, but actually tells us how that commerce was supposed to work.

However the physical and finite world is also full of limits. These sometimes function as boundaries, and serve to close off access. Some limits you can choose to pass beyond, and there are others which you cannot pass. And in some cases, because of the nature of the limit, it is the nature of the limit itself which allows commerce with the ultimate limit of everything, which is where the Gods were once understood to have their existence.

This is the most important thing to understand about antiquity, both east and west. For Moore, the actual infinite is simply something which defies our understanding. In antiquity, the actual infinite was something of vital importance, and which we could have commerce with through its earthlly analogues (totalities, completions, limits. etc). Aristotle, in talking about Zeno’s paradox, is referencing the key doctrinal point, which is that reality has a double nature. And that we have (if we are properly informed), a choice about how we respond to that double nature.

In modern times, we no longer have this choice, since the doctrine concerning actual infinity has been mostly lost, and in fact entirely lost to those who function in the modern successors of Plato’s Academy. We are stuck in a world that imagines it must deal with everything in terms of calculable finitudes. Effectively we are, to quote the Mesopotamian king Esarhaddon, “blind and deaf ” for the whole of our lives.

It was not always so.






Saturday, 28 March 2020

Do Western Academic Philosophy Departments Teach the History of Philosophy?



Greeks fighting in the service of the Assyrian Empire at the Siege of Lachish, 701 BCE

At first sight the title of this article may seem to be provocative, and even slightly daft. However if you study the history of philosophy, including those writers who wrote just before the close of the ancient world, if you are paying attention, you find that the detail of philosophy's course through history is not as it represented in post European Enlightenment writing. The way that history is discussed and understood, suits modern preconceptions. But those modern preconceptions make it almost impossible for us to understand thought in the ancient world, both in the classical period, and in more ancient times.

I've spent much of the past thirty years unpicking questions relating to what that history actually is, beyond the received view in the academy and beyond. The Greeks did not in fact pioneer philosophical thought, and were very far from doing this. Almost everything about the history of philosophy since the Enlightenment is based on the idea that the Greeks did pioneer philosophical thought. This is wrong, and demonstrably wrong.

That is the basis of my project. My intention is not however to just pull these false constructs down, but to also attempt an evidence-based reconstruction. This is skeletal in places, but there is a great deal which can be substantially reconstructed once modern preconceptions are shown to be inconsistent with the ancient evidence.

I've been attacking this idea from a number of different angles, mostly (but not entirely) focussing on the unwarrantable assumptions which are made by scholars about ancient evidence.There are many instances of this, which I've written about extensively. I've also attacked this idea from the point of view of what ancient writers actually said. These remarks are often disregarded, because they do not fit with the generally received view of the history of philosophy.  When read closely, it is often the case that a different picture of our intellectual past emerges.

This is the most recent overview of my project: An Appetite for Knowledge, which points to various articles on my blog, and chapters in my books.  A good place to start for those unfamiliar with my work.

In addition to this approach, I've been contrasting the cultural outputs of both Greece and Ancient Assyria for the purpose of showing that the Greeks borrowed much of their philosophical invention from Assyria and Babylonia, as well as Egypt. Clement of Alexandria listed ancient nations and cultural groups who practised philosophy, and attached the Greeks to the list explicitly as the last of the cultures who embraced philosophy. I sometimes create gazeteers on the basis of articles and chapters, and this is one of those: Transcendental Thought in Ancient Assyria Very few Assyriologists so far argue for the existence of a transcendentalist perspective in Assyria. But...

Between the late ninth and late seventh centuries BCE,  the State of Assyria is the best documented culture in antiquity. The records are voluminous, and many still wait for publication and close study. From what has been published however, the evidence is clear that the Assyrians embraced a transcendental understanding of the nature of the world. For those unfamiliar with the details of the cultural parallels between Greece and Assyria, this gazeteer is a good place to start.

I came to much of this work by studying writers from the third and fourth centuries CE, who are still poorly regarded, and generally ignored in the academic teaching of philosophy. That's our problem, not theirs.

Why did I undertake this project? Sometimes people take on strange tasks. The composer Arnold Schoenberg, once he emigrated to the USA, was asked by a journalist why he took up the unpopular cause of serialist composition. He answered along the lines of: 'someone had to do it. I thought it might as well be me'. My attitude is pretty much the same. I didn't need to do this, and could have chosen to do something else.  But the job needed to be done.

Thomas Yaeger, March 28, 2020.



Friday, 20 March 2020

Transcendental Reality in the Ancient World (Writing to Marie aux Bois)





Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2020 16:24:58 
To: Marie aux Bois
From Thomas Yaeger

Marie,

Re: the paper on the mathematics of the megalithic yard - there's been a lot of movement since I wrote it in the middle of February, and I will write several other articles on the back of it. One of the objections to the argument will be that arriving at Euler's number would have been impossibly complicated for them to do (quite apart from the general case I'm making as to the sense it made for them to want do this). But it isn't true that this is complicated to do, particularly if you work it out geometrically, and use the right kind of exponentiating series (i.e., ones which arrive at the limit of the series in the shortest number of steps). I've already drafted this one.

The argument of the article is fine I think, but at various points it trades on what I know, and what I've written about elsewhere. So I'm going to write another article which brings the relevant information together.

I can make a list of the most significant things in the article:

1. It brings together concepts which were present in Greek civilization and philosophy, as well as in Mesopotamia. So the same ideas are going on in their heads, even if on the face of things the cultures are quite different. For the neolithic case, they are writing in terms of number and geometry.

2 If this argument is sound, it pushes the development of sophisticated mathematical and geometric thought back to the middle to late 4th millennium (3500 -3200 BCE).

3. The argument shows that, on the basis of the mathematics and geometry in the stone circles, that the builders had the same general concept of the existence of a transcendent level of reality which we know for certain the Greeks had. Indeed, historians of ideas pick the Greeks as the originators of the idea of a transcendent level of reality, and behave as if all the other religions in the world did not, before this time.

4 This transcendent level of reality was in fact infinity itself. They came to this conclusion in the Neolithic on the same basis as the Greeks did much later. Which is that the version of reality we inhabit isn't reality at all, but a poor copy of it (I echo Plato's words here). This was established on purely logical grounds, and on the basis of puzzling things about the physical universe (why is there something rather than nothing? If reality itself is necessarily one, otherwise it breaches its nature, how is it possible that there is multiplicity?)

5. And how is it that there are irrational numbers? Again, historians of ideas argue that before the Greeks, and the Pythagoreans in particular, people had no knowledge or understanding of irrational numbers, and when the Pythagoreans discovered their existence, they tried to keep this secret. In fact *the entire basis of Pythagorean thought, both in Greece, and the protoPythagorean megalithic culture was based on the existence and significance of irrational numbers.* I've talked around this issue both in SHB, and in "Understanding Ancient Thought", firstly by discussion of how ancient people conceived that commerce between the Gods and Man was possible, and by discussion of the logical modality that Plato discusses in the "Timaeus", which is based on irrationals.

6. The esoteric core of ancient religion was often kept secret. We know this for sure about the Pythagoreans, the Spartans, the Athenians, and also the ancient Romans. Plus the Assyrians and Babylonians. Modern historians assume that a transcendentalism isn't involved, but rather a doctrine which serves societal and political functions. But what if the esoteric core is too difficult and too dangerous to  convey outside a tight circle of those who understand?

7. Plato discusses how the disagreements about the nature of reality in antiquity might be resolved, in more than one place in "The Sophist". The position  which must be accepted (he says) is that *Reality is both One and Many at the same time*. In other words, the esoteric core of religion, based on the consideration of natural puzzles and the reality of irrational numbers, is that transcendent reality is necessarily paradoxical in nature.

8. Hence the common representation of the transcendent reality as *the inversion of ours* (look up 'Seahenge'). It is the same as this one, but it has different properties. In that transcendent reality, all things are commensurate.

9. Finally, this argument offers the possibility of proving that  transcendental thought did exist at the close of the 4th millennium around a number of cultures. If transcendental thought about the nature of reality was expressed mathematically and geometrically, and  necessarily involved irrational numbers, we should be able to find such references to transcendentalism in many of the architectural and engineering achievements of the ancient world. These have been noticed already in a number of structures, long before I started pursuing this question, but (for example) the golden section, clearly present in a number of Egyptian structures, is written off as a coincidence, or as consequence of the way the structure was laid out in practical terms, and that the builders had no knowledge of  its presence, and did not think the proportion had any significance in itself.

We know the measures the Egyptians used. Scope I think for a nifty little computer programme to number crunch all of these, to look for the presence of Euler's number, and other irrationals.

Best, Thomas

The paper 'The Mathematical Origins of the Meglalithic Yard' is at: https://shrineinthesea.blogspot.com/2020/02/the-mathematical-origins-of-megalithic.html


Thursday, 12 March 2020

Meaning and Function in the British Neolithic (Writing to Paul Devereux)




Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 20:23
To: PAUL DEVEREUX 
From: Thomas Yaeger 
Subject: The Mathematical Origins of the Megalithic Yard


Dear Paul,

Hi. You might be interested in the following blogpost, which looks at why the supposed 'megalithic yard' has the dimensions it has. It takes an entirely different approach to both Thom's surveys and Ruggles later efforts (not statistical analysis, which doesn't do much except expose the general parameters of something which might exist), and which avoids (to a large extent at least), the risk of selection bias. These seem to be the main complaints.

What I've done is to take an entirely new approach, which looks at the megalithic yard as something which serves a function in the context of megalithic structures, and which has a strict mathematical relation to what we already know about these structures (the focus on whole numbers, the use of pythagorean triangles in their construction, and the fact that they are often deformed in various ways, in order to achieve commensuration between the sides of the triangles and the circumference of the circles).

There is a view of reality buried in pythagoreanism, which emerges from the mathematics. This is true both for the later Pythagoreanism of the sixth century BCE, and for the earlier proto-pythagoreanism, since the mathematics are the same, and the interests in the mathematics are essentially the same. That's where the megalithic yard comes from, and I describe this in the post.

I'm afraid the text is as dense as in the paper I submitted to 'Time and Mind' a couple of years ago (it is a tricky subject), but I've kept the necessary mathematics to the bare minimum. It is just under 5k words, so you will need about an hour to digest it.

....

The post is 'The Mathematical Origins of the Megalithic Yard', and is at: https://t.co/BiLRKVq5O1

Hope you are well!

Best regards, Thomas Yaeger

Answers to Questions (Writing to Euan MacKie)





(Photo by Simon Ledingham, May 2005)


Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2020 20:35
To: Euan.MacKie
From: Thomas Yaeger
Subject: The Mathematical Origins of the Megalithic Yard


Euan,

Hi. You might be interested in looking at this article, 'The Mathematical Origins of the Megalithic Yard'  http://shrineinthesea.blogspot.com/2020/02/the-mathematical-origins-of-megalithic.html  

Which I think may be the definitive answer to a number of questions about the construction and purpose of megalithic circles. Obviously this article is subject to criticism, which is fine, and I would be grateful for any comments you may care to make. 

I got to this point over seven years of rumination, and several articles on the Neolithic and patterns of thought in the Neolithic, in so far as they might be inferred from both the archaeological remains, and what ancient writers said about Britain before the Romans arrived.

I was given a classical education at school in Edinburgh (minus Greek literature), and a wider education at UCL later, where I studied Rome, Greece, and the Greek language. As well as Mesopotamia, Egypt and other cultures. My particular interest has always been Greek philosophy. Eventually I found my way back to an interest in British prehistory. I was struck by some of the things which Alexander Thom found through a phenomenological analysis, about the mindset of the Neolithic architects, because they echoed ideas which are commonplace in later Greek philosophy (the importance of the idea that reality itself is necessarily unchanging, meaning the idea of the 'One'; and of Totality, and the importance of commensurate values, and the significance of the fact that commensurate values are sometimes lacking in the physical world, etc.). I've written extensively about the Pythagoreanism of the 1st millennium BCE. Much of which came from the ANE, during Pythagoras's travels. Mainly, but not exclusively from Egypt. It is a technical substrate of Egyptian religion, which Pythagoras imported into his view of the world, after (reputedly, according to the neoplatonists) twenty years of study in Egypt. Meaning that the pythagorean perspective is older than Pythagoras himself, and possibly of immense age.

What we have in the stone circles of the British Isles, is just such a technical substrate of ancient religion, written in mathematics and geometry. Personally, I think most religions got started this way, though we are a long way off from being able to say this for sure. It is not however an argument that is considered at all at the moment in archaeological circles. I think it should be considered, even if only to finally eliminate it for rational consideration.

[Other materials relevant to this article can be found by using the search box on my blog ["neolithic" will pick most of them up].

Best wishes, Thomas  

Monday, 10 February 2020

Heidegger and Barbarism (Writing to @SemprePhi)





This passage is from Heidegger’s lecture series on Parmenides, section 4. I was taught that the use of the term barbaroi by the Greeks originally designated those who were not speakers of Greek, and that the term did not necessarily have negative connotations. It referred to how other languages sounded to Greek ears. I don’t mean to suggest that the Greeks did not have an exceptionalist sense of themselves (they clearly did), but barbaroi was not initially conceived of as some kind of quasi-structuralist contrast with the characteristics of other cultural groups. Persians, Medes, Babylonians and Egyptians were barbaroi because they were not Greek, and often did not speak Greek (Those Egyptian priests who spoke with Solon during his visit to Egypt clearly spoke Greek).

Later of course the term barbaroi did come to have negative connotations particularly as a term used by the Romans), but not generally in Greece in the period between Parmenides and Plato (6th and 5th centuries BCE.)

So what is going on with the passage by Heidegger? He says that for the Greeks, the opposite to ‘barbarism’ is ‘’dwelling within mythos and logos’. This is hard to understand, since mythos and logos indicate quite different ways of thinking. Mythos concerns things which are unascertainable, and usually belong to the world of the gods and of the ancestors, all of which are necessarily wrapped up in a great deal of conjecture. Logos (i.e., ‘reason’) is more associated with things which can be ascertained by rational inquiry, such as investigations into historical, political and societal events.

Did the Greeks blur together their interest in mythos and logos as part of their definition of themselves in the sixth and fifth centuries? Or did they distinguish them as opposites? Or is this just a construct manufactured by Heidegger’s imagination? Where does Heidegger get this from?

The obvious place to look is in the pages of Herodotus. He talks about things which are mythical and difficult to establish as true or false, and also of things which can be ascertained, to an acceptable degree, by careful inquiry into the available information. Though Herodotus sometimes went adrift when he was describing cultures with which he had very little familiarity (Egypt and Babylon in particular). Herodotus spoke of the gods, and their supposed genealogies, but he did not use the term mythos in connection with matters of the gods. Concerning the gods, it is just so much more difficult to establish what is true, and what is merely a matter of conjecture. Plato likewise, left questions about the gods and their genealogies to those who had a better claim to know the truth than he did (those who claimed to be their descendants). The Greeks always imagined themselves as rational creatures, but knew the difference between speculation, and truths which could be established to a reasonable degree.

What Heidegger has to say about the idea of culture is partly correct, but also largely nonsense. Culture was not a concept in the Greek lexicon, for the simple reason that it was so much part of the warp and weft of life that it was hard to separate out as a concept. It was about observance, about ritual, literature and poetry.  They had no word for their religion. Why should they?

But Heidegger characterises culture as the product of the ‘willful power of man’, and compares it to technology, suggesting that the Greeks would have regarded both culture and technology as barbarism, because they were ‘unmythical’. This is ludicrous. The best and most successful technology the Greeks created was the fleet that won the battle of Salamis against the Persians. The Greeks did not have a problem with that, and didn’t regard their victory as an instance of barbarism. This is technology, not culture.

‘Heidegger’s lecture series on Parmenides was delivered at the University of Freiburg in 1942-3. He does not provide a translation of Parmenides poem, or provide a thorough and informed commentary on it. Instead, his subject is the starting point for extensive riffing on ideas about Greece and culture in his head which are without evidential support.

The period in which Heidegger gave these lectures is important if we are to understand what is going on. Heidegger was a supporter of the Nazi party in Germany, and declared that the nature of reality was determined by that party. That makes it possible to say such things as: ‘what you are seeing and hearing is not what is happening’, and other remarks which effectively represent the abdication of reason. When reason and the evidential base have been left behind, it is possible to say all sorts of things, including remarks about the importance of reason which have no reason.

So the assertion that the Greeks understood the opposite to barbarism to be living within both mythos and logos, which is a contradictory pairing, as well as an opposition of concepts based on no evidence at all, needs to be explained. You quoted a scholar who has said that ‘Heidegger's readings of the ancients are heavily determined by the modern polemics in which he is involved… He also lacks a sense for the breadth and diversity of "Greek" thought’. That is correct on both counts, I think. Heidegger cannot be lifted out of the context in which he thought and wrote, but he can be understood, or rather what he thought can be explained, within that context.

The poet Robert Graves rued the fact that Greek mythology was a mess, and that it was often hard to make sense of it. The reason for this is that what survives exists without any documentation of how the various versions of myths (and associated genealogies, which often exist in conflicting versions), came to be constructed. The reason for the mess is fairly simple however – the stories and the genealogies were the work of poets and praise singers, who wrote to support the self-perceptions of their tribal patrons and war lords. Everything was in flux, and imagined genealogies could change as a consequence of defeat in war.

Myth serves many purposes, but often could be repurposed for political and dynastic interests. Sometimes a myth serves as a charter for political change. It doesn’t often serve truth, at least not when it forms part of politics. The writer Alfred Rosenberg, one of the architects of the development of Nazi ideology, wrote The Myth of the 20th Century which contains much of the spurious and evidence-free thought which became the basis of the party and its intentions. His Wikipedia entry tells you what you need to know:

The author of a seminal work of Nazi ideology, The Myth of the Twentieth Century (1930), Rosenberg is considered one of the main authors of key National Socialist ideological creeds, including its racial theory, persecution of the Jews, Lebensraum, abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles, and opposition to what was considered "degenerate" modern art. He is known [also] for his rejection of and hatred for Christianity.
All of this fantasy was forged from WW1 (even before) up to the outbreak of WW2. The party acted on the fantasy as if it was real, and behaved as if what they were doing was entirely rational. In which case both mythos and logos co-existed at the same time in Nazi Germany.

Essentially Heidegger is, by reading back from his own present, attempting to understand ancient Greece in terms of contemporary thought in Nazi Germany. Germany had long thought of itself as the natural successor to Greek civilisation. The fusion of mythos and logos he saw around him was what gave Germany its power, as he imagined an earlier fusion of these gave rise to the power and influence of Greek civilization.

Thomas Yeager, February 10, 2020.

Further reading:
Quick reference guide to the English translations of Heidegger