Part of The Sacred
History of Being is devoted to a substantial discussion of the Ontological
Argument. This may seem to be a rather odd inclusion in a book which is
essentially about the idea of the plenum, and the presence of that idea in
ancient history, at least as far back as the 14th century before the
common era. The reason the discussion is there is because philosophical writing
about the divine in the west departed from the consideration of reality as
something intricately bound up with a plenum during the Middle Ages. As a result,
philosophical argument about the divine, all the way up to the present day,
cannot deal credibly with certain issues, and no longer resembles the kind of
argument about the divine found in ancient literature. The ontological
argument, as formulated from the Middle Ages onwards, contains within itself
the essence of the problem. Which is why I subjected it to a critical
examination.
Essentially philosophy, as a craft and a discipline, is
broken in the modern world. It spends a lot of time running around in circles,
chasing its own tail, and is unable to resolve important questions. Philosophy
is of course, by its very nature, difficult to do well, since it concerns
itself with questions which are fundamental to our
understanding of both ourselves and the world. However some of the difficulties
encountered by philosophers over the past thousand years or so are problems with the presumptions of philosophy
itself, not the complexity of the materials with which it works.
A striking feature of Plato’s discussion of the divine is
his equation of the divine (ho Theos) with reality itself. He also speaks of
the divine in the singular, within the context of a polytheistic culture. Why
does he do this?
The answer is that he understood the idea that behind the world
of appearance was an undifferentiated plenum. Unlike many modern philosophers,
who take physical existence as a given, and do not ask fundamental questions
about what physical existence is, and how it came to be, the question of how it
came to be was something which was referenced not just in Plato’s Timaeus, which overtly addresses the
question, but was a concern which surfaces in his other dialogues. The nature
of the creation therefore was understood to have a bearing on many other
questions which the philosopher ought to consider.
A key part of the concept of the plenum is that it
represents our human understanding of how the world must have been before
anything came to have physical existence. Modern cosmological models of the creation
of the universe (such as they are), assume that there was some kind of creation
ex nihilo, though the process is
necessarily mysterious when looked at from the point of view of physics. The
major problem with the idea of a physical creation, is that there is no physics
before the creation, no laws of nature, no space, no extension, and no time.
There is a complete absence of the principal characteristics of the physical
world that we are familiar with. So there is nothing for a physicist to grapple
with. Hence most discussion of the creation concerns itself with the
hypothetical first microseconds after all these characteristics are imagined to
magically and mysteriously appear.
Yet there is no
absence at the root of the creation. To say that there is such an absence,
is to presume the existence of a presence with which absence can be
contradistinguished. There is nothing at all that we can define as an absence.
Whatever it is, it transcends the category, ‘absence’. It is neither one thing,
or its opposite. It simply is what it is.
How does recognising the transcendent nature of the
underlying plenum change the way we must argue about the creation? The
definition of the plenum is that, since it is something which cannot be
understood as a presence or an absence, it represents instead the potential for
such differentiation; in that sense it can be understood as a fullness of what
it itself is. It is also the one thing which is truly real, in that it is itself,
and does not change its nature. It is beyond time, space and extension. It is
eternal, and eternally itself.
How then is the generation of physical reality, with its
laws and properties, to be explained? Plato sometimes uses different
terminology to refer to the same ideas in his dialogues, which has made some of
his meaning opaque, but he does use the idea of the same and the different in
connection with the creation of time, using the image of the celestial equator
and the ecliptic. According to this image, time began when the two circles were
set at an angle to each other.
In referring to the same and the different, Plato is
alluding to what we understand as the Pythagorean notion of the undefined dyad.
If reality (the plenum) is one, and the one by itself alone, then, if more than
one of anything is to have some kind of existence, the plenum must come to some
kind of relationship with itself. So, the plenum (the same) must in some way stand
in relation to itself as the different.
This of course is an abstract notion. The plenum is
eternally itself, and unchanging. It is also one. If there is to be more than
one, or a multiplicity of anything, this can only be in the form of a
representation within the nature of the plenum. The representation is not truly
real, and any movement within that representation is also not truly real.
This is the origin of the widespread notion in antiquity
that the world is illusion, or Maya. The fact that aspects of this illusion can
have fatal consequences to individuals, if a rock falls off a mountain, or if
people are swept away by a flood, does not undermine the notion that the
physical world is illusion, in comparison with the reality of the underlying
plenum. Neither does the fact that the physical world is structured according
to strict rules, and also functions according to strict rules of what is and is not
possible.
