This is an extract from the book
J.G.Frazer and the Platonic Theory of Being, published April 4, 2016. The extract is presented without its footnotes.
Section Thirteen
13.1. Frazer's work on the development of Plato's thought
has made it more difficult to gain an understanding of the patterns of thought
in antiquity - all his subsequent work is based on the presuppositions and
arguments found in his early essay, and we still function within the vast
paradigmatic frame established by these. And, once in place, the consequences
of these presuppositions and arguments are difficult to move aside:
particularly the view that the notion of magic before classical times
exclusively depended upon the phenomenon of the association of ideas, and
therefore can be understood as a simple species of error, a practice developed
at the very beginning of man's attempt to understand the world around him.
13.2. Frazer worked within a milieu in which such arguments
and assumptions would have been made even without the existence of Frazer
himself, for they were on the tide. His later work never departed radically from
the path set by his initial essay, and its presuppositions and arguments must
be understood if his later monuments are to be assessed at their proper worth.
Frazer erected his theory of Magic on the notion that magical patterns of
thought, magical procedures, etc., can be explained according to the idea that
ordered beliefs about the world are conditioned by the tendency of the mind to
associate ideas, whether or not there is in fact such a relation between the
objects which give rise to the subjective ideas of them. Thus habitual
association gives false weight to notions of the world, and in the absence of
adequate procedures of verification, these notions are not easily displaced. In
his chapter on "Our Debt to the Savage"*[89] he says that:
When all is said and done our resemblances to the savage are
still far more numerous than our differences from him; and what we have in
common with him, and deliberately retain as true and useful, we owe to our
savage forefathers who slowly acquired by experience and transmitted to us by
inheritance those seemingly fundamental ideas which we are apt to regard as
original and intuitive... their errors were not wilful extravagances or the
ravings of insanity, but simply hypotheses, justifiable as such at the time
when they were propounded, but which a fuller experience has proved to be
inadequate. It is only by the successive testing of hypotheses and rejection of
the false that truth is at last elicited.
13.3. And since "truth" in science is no more than
the best working hypothesis, the one with the greatest degree of competitive
plausibility,
...in reviewing the opinions and practices of ruder ages and
races we shall do well to look with leniency upon their errors as inevitable
slips made in the search for truth...*[90]
13.4. When Frazer speaks of these "inevitable
slips", he means the ancient philosophers, including Plato, as well as our
"savage" ancestors (that he understood this search for truth as an
anabasis without limit is indicated by his provisional inclusion of his own
work in this progression). The Platonic hypothesis as framed by Frazer in his
essay of 1879 is one which a "fuller experience has proved to be
inadequate". Before Plato, before Socrates, we are dealing with a much
cruder set of beliefs and opinions concerning the world - the "quaint
superstitions, the old-world maxims, the venerable saws which the ingenuity of
savage philosophers elaborated long ago..." These customary beliefs and
opinions centred around the king: those
men to whom the superstition of their fellows ascribes a
controlling influence over the general course of nature... [his] life and
health... are matters of anxious concern to the people whose welfare and even
existence are bound up with his; naturally he is constrained by them to conform
to such rules as the wit of early man has devised for averting the ills to
which flesh is heir... The king was enmeshed in these "antique
fancies", so that he "could hardly stir a limb for the threads of
custom" and was "boundfast within a network of observances from which
death or deposition alone could release him*[91].
13.5. And thus it is to ancient kingship and related
institutions that we must turn (as Frazer did) if we are to understand the
past, for
the life of the old kings and priests teems with
instruction. In it was summed up all that passed for wisdom when the world was
young. It was the perfect pattern after which every man strove to shape his
life; a faultless model constructed with rigorous accuracy upon the lines laid
down by a barbarous philosophy...
13.6. And while we can fault the premises of this
philosophy, "it deduces for the practical guidance of life a system of
rules which in general hangs well together and forms a fairly complete and
harmonious whole"*[92].
13.7. Frazer argues*[93] that Magic precedes religion
and religion precedes science, as a kind of natural order of progression,
"and the order on which magic reckons is merely an extension by false
analogy, of the order in which ideas present themselves to our minds",
whereas in acuter minds
magic is gradually superseded by by religion, which explains
the succession of natural phenomena as regulated by the will, the passion, or
the caprice of spiritual beings like man in kind, though vastly superior to him
in power... Keener minds, still pressing forward to a deeper solution of the
mysteries of the universe, come to reject the religious theory of nature as
inadequate, and to revert in measure to the older standpoint of magic by
postulating explicitly, what in magic had only been implicitly assumed, to
wit an inflexible regularity in the order of natural events, which if carefully
observed, enables us to foresee their course with certainty and to act
accordingly.
13.8. The passage emphasised by my italics is critically
important. For Frazer, magic, conceived of as a phenomenon based on the
association of ideas, may come to be operated in the absence of an explicit
theory of Being, and have nothing to do with such a conception. Nowhere in
the Golden Bough is there any intimation that notions of magic
may arise from a notion of the nature of Being: it would seem that either the
idea was considered by him and subsequently dismissed, or that it did not occur
to him at all.
13.9. Before passing on to a discussion of the relationship
between magic and theories of Being it is worth digressing a little, to
consider a methodological problem of Frazer's, which bears on this difficulty
in connecting magic and the concept of Being. Frazer does not stratify his
evidence: the "beliefs" of "savages" of his own day are
conflated with those of antiquity: the magical operations of kings and priests
are hardly distinguished in quality from the events recorded in folklore
("the venerable saws... of savage philosophers... which old women at chimney
corners still impart as treasures of great price to their descendants"*[94]).
Frazer may thus have been in the thoughts of the scholar D'Arcy Thompson, when
he complained of those who,
running folklore to the death, seek to read antiquity in the
light of savagery; ...who arrive at what I unhesitatingly regard as
misconception by the double blunder of unduly depreciating the complexity of
initial or archaic Greek thought and unduly exalting the importance and too
freely correlating the results of their own study of incipient or semibarbarous
civilizations. We must see fallacy in any theory which treats as nascent and
primitive the civilization of a period of exalted poetry, the offspring of ages
of antecedent culture; which sees but a small advance on recent barbarism in
ways of life simple in some respects but rich in developed art and stored with
refined tradition; that looks only for the ways and habits and thoughts of
primitive man in races supported by a background of philosophical and
scientific culture of an unfathomed, and maybe unfathomable antiquity*[95]
13.10. It is a strange and unscientific way to deal with
evidence, to assume that it is not necessary to evaluate the worth of each
piece on its own merits, quite apart from the question of whether or not it
fits into the large picture. But it follows quite naturally from the
preconceptions of the time: if there is no ontological basis for the various
beliefs of the ancients and savages, how are they to be graded and related to
one another and to be given value of any sort? They are all mistakes, and do
not form a sequence of a kind that might allow a progression to be determined.
Thus Frazer grouped his study of patterns of belief thematically.
13.11. Frazer firmly locates magic as a phenomenon which
precedes an explicit theory of Being, the result of quite startlingly false
analogical thinking. The error in magic he defines as of two kinds: sympathetic
and contagious. In the case of sympathetic magic, "the magician infers
that he can produce any effect he desires merely by imitating it".
Contagious magic involves the inference "that whatever he does to a
material object will affect equally the person with whom the object was once in
contact..."*[96].
13.12. Further, he argues that:
its fundamental conception is identical with that of modern
science; underlying the whole system is a faith, implicit but real and firm, in
the order and uniformity of nature...He [the magician] supplicates no higher
power*[97]
.
13.13. Religion also, according to Frazer, is not a phenomenon
whose origin can be traced to a theory of Being, despite the fact that it
involves "a belief in powers higher than man and an attempt to propitiate
or please them"*[98] . Why then does this change in patterns of
belief take place? Frazer's attempt to explain this is perhaps the weakest part
of his work. He suggests (with diffidence) that
a tardy recognition of the inherent falsehood and barrenness
of magic set the more thoughtful part of mankind to cast about for a truer
theory of nature and a more fruitful method of turning her resources to
account... The discovery amounted to this, that men for the first time
recognised their inability to manipulate at pleasure certain natural forces
which hitherto they had believed to be completely within their control. It was
a confession of human ignorance and weakness... If the great world went on its
way without the help of him or his fellows, it must surely be because there
were other beings, like himself, but far stronger, who, unseen themselves,
directed its course and brought about all the varied series of events which he
had hitherto believed to be dependent on his own magic... To these mighty
beings, whose handiwork he traced in all the gorgeous and varied pageantry of
nature, man now addressed himself, humbly confessing his dependence on their
invisible power... In this, or some such way as this, the deeper minds may be
conceived to have made the great transition from magic to religion. But even in
them the change can hardly ever have been sudden; probably it proceeded very
slowly, and required long ages for its more or less perfect accomplishment. For
the recognition of man's powerlessness to influence the course of nature on a
grand scale must have been gradual; he cannot have been shorn of the whole of
his fancied dominion at a blow... religion, beginning as a slight and partial
acknowledgement of powers superior to man, tends with the growth of knowledge
to deepen into a confession of man's entire and absolute dependence on the
divine*[99]
.
13.14. Thus Frazer detects in the divinities the
personification of the great natural forces which man cannot control; and
theories of Being, it would appear, have no part to play in this history of
man's intellectual development; Being as a concept, it would seem, belongs only
to a very narrow rung of the ladder of human intellectual progress, somewhere
between the decay of religious explanation and the rise of empiricism and
inductive method. The gods are merely inferential beings, without explanation
beyond the fact that some such powers, on the basis of experience, must exist,
if the nature of the world is to be understood.
13.15. That magic is conceived of as an operative phenomenon
depends, as Frazer says, on there being sympathy and contact between things: relation
of some sort must exist if magical results are to occur. Frazer argues that
this is a species of intellectual error, essentially twofold, in that likeness
is misread for identity, and contact for a moment is misread for contact at all
times. No theory of Being among the ancients is however invoked by Frazer to
explain this pattern of belief. But are we really to accept that at all
times and at all levels, the practitioners of magic have been the
victims of such stupid thoughts? That mere similarity was confused with
identity, and that a brief contiguity likewise was taken, of itself, to
establish a permanent relationship?
13.16. If we recall the passage in the Timaeus where
similar forms are asserted to form a unity and thus to be interchangeable, it
might be argued that Plato is attempting to supply an account of the relation
of things on the basis of similarity, within the context of a theory of Being*[100].
Frazer perhaps understood the Platonic Philosophy as the culmination of a way
of thinking, which, though it attempted to move forward, was boundfast by an
inherited and inherent fallacy. But, though it is true that Plato's account of
the theory of the Forms is unsatisfactory in the manner in which it is
discussed, his theory of Being provides a paradigm of reality in which magical
relationships ought to have been intelligible.
13.17. That it does not, on the face of it, provide a model
for the understanding of magical relationships in antiquity is due essentially
to the history of the interpretation of the fact that, clearly, the theory of
Being breaks down in the course of Plato's work, and that the Intelligibles
cannot, either exist unmoved, or exist unmoved and be known. The third
alternative, which is voiced by the Eleatic Stranger at Soph. 249c-d,
that Reality embraces both the unchangeable and the changing, similarly appears
to have provided no model for the understanding of magical relationships, since
it is a default position, agreed among the speakers in the dialogue because
they have no other option. If, as in this case, the world of Forms is
indistinguishable from the world of changing appearances, it has been
understood that we are left with little more than the assertion of relation
between similars (looking very like the Frazerian position on magic). Therefore
the ultimate "disappearance" of the theory as an explanatory device
of any worth is read as Plato's rejection of his own theory; lingering in his
work for a time, just as the Ptolemaic account of the Cosmos lingered on (in
Milton's Paradise Lost, for example) after the work of Copernicus
and Galileo rendered it theoretically outmoded.
13.18. It would seem therefore that a theory of Being cannot
support a pattern of belief, except for those who do not or cannot examine with
precision the material which they are to believe. This however, is no reason to
reject it as a possibility among the ancients, if we are to accept that they
were starting out on the long road to rational thought. After all, the
Frazerian picture of the development of Plato's thought implies that he did not
spot the fallacies in his argument until late in his career. The fact that a
pattern of thought may be held in error does not mean that it may not be held
at all.
13.19. Yet the later nineteenth century had a peculiar
aversion to allowing a venerable ancient history to the concept of Being, and
abstract ideas in general; and this view is still broadly adhered to, though
reasons for supporting this model of human intellectual history are
increasingly hard to come by. The reasons for the unacceptability of abstract
ideas among the ancients are difficult to unravel, but have much to do with the
development of anthropological ideas, and the stratification of man, both
socially and historically. I have already illustrated that Frazer runs
antiquity and the savage close together. A passage from his chapter on
"Magic and Religion", p73, suggests that for him the equation was both
conscious and quite seriously maintained. He speaks of the diversity of
religious views in the world "which affect mainly the intelligent and
thoughtful part of the community", but suggests that
when we have penetrated through these differences... we shall
find underlying them all a solid stratum of intellectual agreement among the
dull, the weak, the ignorant, and the superstitious, who constitute,
unfortunately, the vast majority of mankind.
13.20. Here Frazer tells us something of the strong sense
possessed by the upper levels of society in late victorian England that they
were supported by a large mass of people they neither knew or understood. This
belief was strongly held:
One of the great achievements of the nineteenth century was
to run shafts down into this low mental stratum in many parts of the world, and
thus to discover its essential identity everywhere... This universal faith,
this truly Catholic creed, is a belief in the efficacy of magic... Among the
ignorant and superstitious classes of modern Europe it is very much what it was
thousands of years ago in Egypt and India, and what it now is among the lowest
savages surviving in the remotest corners of the world*[101]
13.21. The equation is clear. The repellent fascination with
a barbarous antiquity is kin to the nineteenth century fascination with the
horrors of what he later calls "a standing menace to civilization",
the "solid layer of savagery beneath the surface of society... unaffected
by the superficial changes of religion and culture"*[102]. Naturally, given this equation as a premiss, it is
impossible to ascribe to the ancients of remotest historical time, steeped in
magic and ritual as they were, a capacity to deal in abstract ideas; far less
that the details of their culture and beliefs might have been shaped by
theories of Being.
13.22. This unfortunate association of ideas was understood,
in the late nineteenth century, to make necessary a corollary between the
biological nature of populations and their cultural production. There is not
much evidence for this notion however: and no indication at all that there has
been a change in the capacity of man to deal in abstractions over historical
time. Changes in intellectual production ought to be approached - initially at
least - as purely cultural phenomena. But the idea of the corollary between the
"low mental stratum" and the "savage" was so strongly held
that it occurred to few that they were dealing with a persuasive notion rather
than an established fact.
