Taylor's translations were originally issued in very short print runs. However they were occasionally reprinted during the nineteenth century, according to no particular plan, and all survive. All Taylor's works were republished in a uniform edition at the beginning of the 21st century by the Prometheus Trust.
Thomas Taylor, from his additional
notes to the Select Works of Plotinus, note to p122 ,“On
Eternity and Time”, sect. IV and V. – Sect. V contains: “Because,
however, such a nature as this, thus all-beautiful and perpetual,
subsists about the one, proceeding from and with it, and in no
respect departing from it, but always abides about and in the one,
and lives according to it, hence I think it is beautifully and with a
profundity of decision, said by Plato, that “eternity abides in
one,” that he might not only lead it to the one which is in
itself, but that he might also in a similar manner lead the life of
being about the one. This, therefore, is that which we
investigate, and that which thus abides is eternity.”
Taylor comments in footnote 2 that
“Plato, however, does not by the one in this place, mean the
ineffable principle of things, but the one of being, or the summit
of the intelligible order, as is shown by Proclus....”
'Hence there is something even
beyond the one. – The most sublime of the arcane dogmas of
the Platonic Theology is this, that the ineffable principle of things
is something even beyond the one, as is demonstrated by
Proclus in his second book “On the Theology of Plato,” and
particularly by Damascius in his MS. Treatise [Gk. peri archon], “On
Principles.” See my translation of the former of these works, and
of an extract from the latter in the Additional Notes at the end of
the third Volume of my Plato, and in my “Dissertation on the
Philosophy of Aristotle.” From this extract, the following
observations are selected.'
“The one is not the one as
that which is smallest, but is the one in all things. For by
its own simplicity it accedes to all things, and makes all things to
be one. Hence all things proceed from it, because it is itself all
things prior to all. And as that which has an united subsistence is
prior to things which are separated from each other, so the one
is many prior to the many. All things, therefore, are
from the one, and with reference to the one, as we are
accustomed to say.
If then according to a more usual manner of
speaking, we call things which consist in multitude and separation
all things, we must admit that the united, and in a
still greater degree the one, are the principles of these. But
if we consider these two as all things, and asume them in conjunction
with all other things, according to habitude and co-ordination with
them, we must then investigate another principle prior to all things,
which it is no longer proper to consider in any way as all things,
nor to co-arrange with its progeny. For if some one should say that
the one, though it is all things which have in any respect a
subsistence, yet is one prior to all things, and is
more one than all things; since it is one by itself,
but all things as the cause of all, and according to a
co-ordination with all things; - if this should be said, the one
will thus be doubled, and we ourselves shall become doubled, and
multiplied about its simplicity. For, by being the one it is
all things after the most simple manner. At the same time also,
though this should be said, it is necessary that the principle of all
things should be exempt from all things, and consequently that it
should be exempt from the most simple allness, and from a
simplicity absorbing all things, such as is that of the one.
Our soul, therefore, prophesies that the principle which is beyond
all things that can in any respect be conceived, is unco-ordinated
with all things. Neither, therefore, must it be called principle nor
cause, nor that which is first nor prior to all things, nor beyond
all things. By no means, therefore, must we celebrate it as all
things, nor, in short, is it to be celebrated, or recalled into
memory. We may also add, that the one is the summit of the
many, as the cause of the things proceeding from it: and that we
form a conception of the one according to a purified suspicion
extended to that which is most simple and most comprehensive. But
that which is most venerable must necessarily be incomprehensible by
all conceptions and suspicions; since also in other things, that
which always soars beyond our conceptions is more honourable than
that which is more obvious; so that what flies from all our
suspicions will be most honourable. But if this be the case,
it is nothing.
Let however nothing be twofold, one better than
the one, the other posterior to sensibles. If also we strive in vain
in asserting these things, striving in vain is likewise twofold; the
one falling into the ineffable, the other into that which in no
respect whatever has any subsistence. For the latter also is
ineffable, as Plato says, yet according to the worse, but the former
according to the better. If, too, we search for a certain advantage
arising from it, this is the most necessary advantage of all others,
that all things proceed as from an adytum, from the ineffable, and in
an ineffable manner. For neither do they proceed as the one
produces the many, nor as the united things separated,
but as the ineffable similarly produces all things ineffably.
But if in asserting these things concerning it, that it is ineffable,
that it is no one of all things, that it is incomprehensible, we
subvert what we say, it is proper to know that these are the names
and words of our parturitions, daring anxiously to explore it, and
which, standing in the vestibules of the adytum, announce indeed
nothing pertaining to the ineffable, but signify the manner in which
we are affected about it, our doubts and disappointments; nor yet
this clearly, but through indications to such as are able to
understand these investigations. We also see that our parturitions
suffer these things about the one, and that in a similar
manner they are solicitous and subverted. For the one, says
Plato, if it is, is not the one. But if it is not, no
assertion can be adapted to it: so that neither can there be a
negation of it, nor can any name be given to it; for neither is a
name simple. Nor is there any opinion nor science of it. For neither
are these simple; nor is intellect itself simple. So that the one
is in every respect unknown and ineffable.
“What then Shall we investigate
something else beyond the ineffable? Or perhaps, indeed, Plato leads
us ineffably through the one as a medium, to the ineffable
beyond the one which is now the subject of discussion; and
this by an ablation of the one, in the same manner as he leads
us to the one by an ablation of other things. But if having
ascended as far as to the one he is silent, this also is
becoming in Plato to be perfectly silent, after the manner of the
ancients, concerning things in every respect unspeakable; for the
discourse was indeed most dangerous in consequence of falling on
idiotical ears. Hence that which is beyond the one is to be
honoured in the most perfect silence, and prior to this, by the most
perfect ignorance, which despises all knowledge” [As that which is
below all knowledge is an ignorance worse than knowledge, so the
silence in which our ascent to the ineffable terminates, is succeeded
by an ignorance superior to all knowledge. Let it, however, be
carefully remembered, that such an ignorance is only to be obtained
after the most scientific and intellectual energies].
And in another part of the same
admirable work, he further observes: “Ascending therefore to the
one, shall we meet with it as that which is known? Or wishing to
meet with it as such shall we arrive at the unknown? May we not say
that each of these is true? For we meet with it afar off as that
which is far known; and when we are united to it from afar, passing
beyond that in our nature which is far known; and when we are united
to it from afar, passing beyond that in our nature which is gnostic
of the one, then are we brought to be one, that is to be
unknown instead of being gnostic. This contact, therefore, as of one
with one, is above knowledge, but the other is as of that which is
gnostic with that which is known. As, however, the crooked is known by
the straight, so we form a conjecture of the unknown by the known.
And this indeed is a mode of knowledge.
The one, therefore, is
so far known, that it does not admit of an approximating knowledge,
but appears afar off as known, and imparts a gnostic indication of
itself. Unlike other things, however, the nearer we approach to it,
it is not the more, but on the contrary less known; knowledge being
dissolved by the one into ignorance, since as we have before
observed where there is knowledge there is also separation. But
separation approaching to the one is inclosed in union; so
that knowledge also is refunded into ignorance.
This, too, the
analogy of Plato requires. For first, we endeavour to see the sun,
and we do indeed see it afar off; but by how much the nearer we
approach to it, by so much the less do we see it: and at length, we
neither see other things nor it, the eye becoming spontaneously
dazzled by its light. Is therefore the one in its proper
nature unknown, though there is something else unknown beside the
one? The one indeed wills to be by itself, but with no other; but
the unknown, beyond the one, is perfectly ineffable, which we
acknowledge we neither know, nor are ignorant of, but which has about
itself super-ignorance. Hence by proximity to this the one
itself is darkened: for being very near to the immense principle,
if it be lawful so to speak, it remains as it were in the adytum of
that truly mystic silence.
On this account, Plato in speaking of it
finds all his assertions subverted: for it is near to the subversion
of every thing, which takes place about the first. It differs from it
however in this, that it is one simply, and that according to
the one it is also at the same time all things. But the first
is above the one and all things, being more simple than
either of these.”
