One of the greatest barriers to the understanding of Plato is that he is writing from a perspective quite different from our own. I say ‘our own’, because this perspective can be clearly defined as something which we, in our cultural continuum, implicitly accept (even if a number of individuals in that culture don’t). That is, we assume that what is real is what is physical. So when Plato was writing about what is metaphysical rather than the physical, he was writing about something extra, something beyond that physical reality. Sometimes this other level of reality is spoken of as a supersensible realm, in that it is beyond the world of sensory experience, and also beyond a comprehension which requires sense data.
This is not the way that Plato would have looked at
transcendent reality. It is not something extra, superposed on physical reality
and the world of sensory experience. It was there first, and had its existence
before matter and sensory experience came to have existence.
This is the plenum, which I have discussed elsewhere. It is
unlimited, and undefined. It is what must be there before anything is defined.
It is neither presence nor absence. It can be thought of as the nothingness
before the creation of anything, but to characterise it as nothingness is to
misunderstand both what it is, and how it needs to be understood.
If the physical world did not exist, and so there was no
such thing as movement, all that might be possible, in terms of a physical
existence, and consequently movement, would necessarily exist in potential in
that transcendent and undefined plenum. The evidence of our senses, and the categories
of our understanding, tell us that the world of movement and change, illusion
or not, has a certain level of reality, which has a certain mathematical
regularity, which is one way to define something which has intelligible
reality. All of that is necessarily present in the plenum, which is
ever-present and unchanging, and devoid of actual movement. Of any sort at all.
From Plato’s point of view, the transcendent reality is the
only thing which is truly real, and which is necessarily what it is, and not
something other than it is. It is not a copy of anything. It is eternal in its
nature, and is not subject to change of any sort.
The major difficulty in understanding Plato arises from the
fact that almost all discussion in Plato’s canon of works is based on an
abstract understanding of the transcendent reality. He is not trying to
penetrate what is transcendently real from the point of view of physical or
sensory reality, existing in time and space. Instead, he has an understanding
of the nature of what is real, largely built on logical and dialectical argument.
By this I mean the nature of reality itself can be
approached and understood by questioning what it is, and what it is not, what
properties it may or may not have, and how it stands in relation to the
physical world. Questions such as ‘is reality itself one or many? If it is one,
how is it the case that the physical and sensory world is full of things, and
why is it represented to us in such a way?’ And the opposite question also
makes sense: ‘if reality consists of the many, and not one thing, in what way
can we understand reality as reality itself? Why should there be many things at
the root of reality?’
Which is how the ancient consensus about the nature of
reality came to be. This consensus was in place as early as the mid-second millennium BCE. But possibly much earlier than that.
So much of Plato’s argumentation is based on a point of view
which we generally do not share in the modern world, and which is hard for us
to fathom. Where Plato's work is taught, which is almost every major academic
institution in the world, it is not taught or understood in terms of a range of
arguments which apply to the transcendent reality, and questions of existence
and the creation of a physical world which is full of both things and images.
Instead, it is taught in terms of exercises in human thought, covering a vast
range of subjects, including discussions of metaphysics, the ideas of beauty
and justice, ethics and morality, of friendship and love, mathematics, geometry; even philology and
etymology (in the Cratylus). It is taught in this way, since much of subsequent
philosophical thought has its roots in Plato’s dialogues, even if we do not
fully understand the point of view expressed in them.
So Platonic thought is taught in a fragmentary way, which
Plato would not have understood, and the intellectual and logical roots of the
dialogues are often treated as neither here nor there.
The tradition of studying Plato lay largely fallow after the
collapse of the ancient world, and particularly after the closure of the philosophical schools in
529 C.E. This closure is an extremely significant event in history, though the
destruction of the glories of the ancient world had been under way already for
a considerable period (as far back as the argument with Caligula about putting
images of Caesar in the temple in Jerusalem, recorded by Philo Judaeus, who was
the man who drew the short straw). The closure of the schools tells us that the
basis upon which the ancient world once argued about the nature of reality and
physical existence was opposed by imperial power and its requirements, and that
humanity was entering a period in which knowledge and thought were thoroughly deprecated.
Ideas of the importance of knowledge and what it is, and
also what is meant by the divine, and the role of the divine for the human
race, were now based on the requirements of the secular powers, and their political
and ideological concerns.
Formerly, political power, and royal and imperial knowledge
of the will of the divine and the gods, drew strength from the idea that there
was a rational connection between the nature of reality and the divine, and the
world of the here and now, the secular world of time, and of physical power
(expressed eloquently by Homer, with the golden chain of Zeus stretching into
the world, according to his will). Now the nature of reality was of no
interest, and gave nothing to the secular powers. Whatever was left of the
notion of a rational connection between physical reality and the divine ran the
other way. Physical power and its preoccupations would now determine the kinds
of discussions there would be about divine things.
We have been on this downward slide since the time of
imperial Rome and its campaigns of conquest. It is one of the most powerful of
Roman legacies.
The story of the occasional and partial reversals of this long
intellectual and cultural slide has yet to be told coherently, and I am not
going to undertake the task here. I will mention the reversal in the Italian
renaissance, where Plato was understood rather differently than he is now. For
example, it is useful to approach Plato through Marsilio Ficino’s understanding
of his work, and also through the writings of Giordano Bruno.
So it is not that we have no alternative ways to approach
Platonic thought; but we choose not to look at another approach, since we know
what is real, and what isn’t. We think this is a rational view, and our own way of thinking, but it
has been gifted to us as the result of political and ideological struggles long
ago, which did not fear to destroy rational connection with a transcendent
Reality, once understood as the reason why the physical world existed at all.
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