Showing posts with label Neoplatonism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Neoplatonism. Show all posts

Thursday, 12 March 2020

Meaning and Function in the British Neolithic (Writing to Paul Devereux)




Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2020 20:23
To: PAUL DEVEREUX 
From: Thomas Yaeger 
Subject: The Mathematical Origins of the Megalithic Yard


Dear Paul,

Hi. You might be interested in the following blogpost, which looks at why the supposed 'megalithic yard' has the dimensions it has. It takes an entirely different approach to both Thom's surveys and Ruggles later efforts (not statistical analysis, which doesn't do much except expose the general parameters of something which might exist), and which avoids (to a large extent at least), the risk of selection bias. These seem to be the main complaints.

What I've done is to take an entirely new approach, which looks at the megalithic yard as something which serves a function in the context of megalithic structures, and which has a strict mathematical relation to what we already know about these structures (the focus on whole numbers, the use of pythagorean triangles in their construction, and the fact that they are often deformed in various ways, in order to achieve commensuration between the sides of the triangles and the circumference of the circles).

There is a view of reality buried in pythagoreanism, which emerges from the mathematics. This is true both for the later Pythagoreanism of the sixth century BCE, and for the earlier proto-pythagoreanism, since the mathematics are the same, and the interests in the mathematics are essentially the same. That's where the megalithic yard comes from, and I describe this in the post.

I'm afraid the text is as dense as in the paper I submitted to 'Time and Mind' a couple of years ago (it is a tricky subject), but I've kept the necessary mathematics to the bare minimum. It is just under 5k words, so you will need about an hour to digest it.

....

The post is 'The Mathematical Origins of the Megalithic Yard', and is at: https://t.co/BiLRKVq5O1

Hope you are well!

Best regards, Thomas Yaeger

Answers to Questions (Writing to Euan MacKie)





(Photo by Simon Ledingham, May 2005)


Date: Wed, 11 Mar 2020 20:35
To: Euan.MacKie
From: Thomas Yaeger
Subject: The Mathematical Origins of the Megalithic Yard


Euan,

Hi. You might be interested in looking at this article, 'The Mathematical Origins of the Megalithic Yard'  http://shrineinthesea.blogspot.com/2020/02/the-mathematical-origins-of-megalithic.html  

Which I think may be the definitive answer to a number of questions about the construction and purpose of megalithic circles. Obviously this article is subject to criticism, which is fine, and I would be grateful for any comments you may care to make. 

I got to this point over seven years of rumination, and several articles on the Neolithic and patterns of thought in the Neolithic, in so far as they might be inferred from both the archaeological remains, and what ancient writers said about Britain before the Romans arrived.

I was given a classical education at school in Edinburgh (minus Greek literature), and a wider education at UCL later, where I studied Rome, Greece, and the Greek language. As well as Mesopotamia, Egypt and other cultures. My particular interest has always been Greek philosophy. Eventually I found my way back to an interest in British prehistory. I was struck by some of the things which Alexander Thom found through a phenomenological analysis, about the mindset of the Neolithic architects, because they echoed ideas which are commonplace in later Greek philosophy (the importance of the idea that reality itself is necessarily unchanging, meaning the idea of the 'One'; and of Totality, and the importance of commensurate values, and the significance of the fact that commensurate values are sometimes lacking in the physical world, etc.). I've written extensively about the Pythagoreanism of the 1st millennium BCE. Much of which came from the ANE, during Pythagoras's travels. Mainly, but not exclusively from Egypt. It is a technical substrate of Egyptian religion, which Pythagoras imported into his view of the world, after (reputedly, according to the neoplatonists) twenty years of study in Egypt. Meaning that the pythagorean perspective is older than Pythagoras himself, and possibly of immense age.

What we have in the stone circles of the British Isles, is just such a technical substrate of ancient religion, written in mathematics and geometry. Personally, I think most religions got started this way, though we are a long way off from being able to say this for sure. It is not however an argument that is considered at all at the moment in archaeological circles. I think it should be considered, even if only to finally eliminate it for rational consideration.

[Other materials relevant to this article can be found by using the search box on my blog ["neolithic" will pick most of them up].

Best wishes, Thomas  

Tuesday, 29 October 2019

An Appetite for Knowledge



I have argued elsewhere that ideas of Being, of the nature of reality, and the divine, were once approached  in terms of conjectures about the reality (or otherwise) of the one and the many. These conjectures follow on from the initial question, which is: why is there something rather than nothing? Plato’s argument, following on from propositions made by Parmenides, who declared that we should look only to the one, and that only the one truly is real, is the most sophisticated of all discussions in antiquity concerning why there should be something rather than nothing.

Plato argues that we should always look to the ‘one true thing’. This is different from saying only the one exists, or only the one is truly real.

The anthropologist and classicist J.G. Frazer was very dismissive of Greek questions concerning the one and the many, saying that they constituted ‘popular questions of the day’. The argument of Parmenides about the nature of Being  remained entirely undiscussed by Frazer.  But then he argued that questions concerning Being were entirely barren, since nothing could be predicated of Being.*1

This of course is a spectacular instance of intellectual blindness, by which the richness of the intellectual matrix of ancient Greek thought was spirited into nothingness. We like to see Plato’s articulate discussion of Being as the surfacing of a human capacity to grapple with abstract ideas, and the marker of our emancipation from irrational ideas about the world and the gods. For Frazer, Plato was as guilty of intellectual error as any of his contemporaries, as well as his predecessors.

In late Hellenistic times, there seems to have been a very poor grasp of the context of the development of philosophy around the Mediterranean. Nods were made toward the notion that the discipline of philosophy might not have been first developed in Greece, including (tellingly) at the beginning of Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of the Philosophers.  Plato after all argued against the idea that this was so in the Protagoras, saying that the practice of philosophy was of a great age – perhaps contemporary with the arrival of peoples from Egypt, who settled in the Peloponnese, and also in Crete. He also presented Solon in discussion with Egyptian priests in the pages of the Timaeus, who found the Greeks to be very young, and not conversant with knowledge ‘hoary with age’.  

Aristotle presented the common sense view that philosophy was first developed in a place where there was a leisured class, with the time and resources to think about philosophical questions. He may have had Egypt in mind, since Egypt had professionalised priesthoods. Later philosophers such as Porphyry suggested that key parts of Pythagorean doctrine came west to Greece from Babylon, in the late sixth century B.C.E.*2  Plato references details of this doctrine, without connecting it explicitly to Pythagoras.*3 Aspects of that doctrine can be found elsewhere in the pages of Herodotus (concerning Solon),*4  and also in Homer’s Iliad (Book 18), where a number of key details associated with the doctrine are run together in close order, without being explained. *5

The former Priest of Bel at Babylon, Berossus, moved to Athens, and wrote about Babylonian history and philosophy, describing their system of knowledge as based on the idea of an initial plenum (which is a philosophical concept) using the image of a sage emerging daily from beneath the sea (symbolising primal fulness and abundance), granting knowledge to man about the sciences, agriculture, and the practical arts. *6 He also gave information about the Babylonian New Year festival (Enuma Elish), the liturgy for which contained accounts of two creations: the first irrational, and the second one, rational, and which was given its rational character by the chief of the Babylonian gods.*7  Berossus' book was the Babyloniaka, unfortunately now lost. But the christian writer Eusebius had access to it as late as the early fourth century C.E, and quoted a number of passages from it which survive in his writings. Recovered Mesopotamian texts, including tablets containing the Enuma Elish liturgy, generally confirm the accuracy of Berossus. 

Not much of this was of use to the Enlightenment agenda, which preferred to look at the development of philosophy in Greece as the first beginnings of a rational understanding of the world. And so the information was deprecated and ignored. The phrase ‘I doubt that’ is a dangerous one in the classics community. It is a way of saying ‘this is not the consensus view of scholars and the profession’. Usually no discussion follows, since the opinion is usually an opinion of the worth (or otherwise) of evidence. Scholars weigh evidence, and they do so (they are convinced) with better tools than were available to ancient scholars. The judgement is fitted to modern requirements. So, as a result, it is clear that it is unlikely that Solon visited Egypt, and that Pythagoras visited Babylon. Tread carefully, or your credibility as a scholar may be in doubt.

Thus, the scholarly consensus is that philosophy is an autochthonous development. The culture of the modern west rests on this idea.Why in Greece? The idea of the ‘Greek genius’ won’t cut the mustard any more, at least by itself, but I have heard the phrase uttered by people who should know better. But during the high days of the enlightenment, and the beginnings of what became the fully-fledged discipline of Classics, that is what the scholars wanted. Something pure and out of the orbit of other cultures, which, by definition, had no philosophy or anything which would measure up to something like rational thought.

Sometimes history is built backwards. It isn’t just a matter of looking to the historical record and starting from that. History always has been in part about critical scrutiny of sources and judgements, even among the Greeks *8 But as Bernal pointed out in the first volume of his Black Athena, the critical revision begun in the enlightenment was wholesale, and created an alternative representation of the origins of European civilisation.

That was the agenda. To reinterpret the past, and in terms of a rational and enlightened understanding of the world. Hence, the philosophe Denis Diderot wrote not just about ideas and philosophy in his Encyclopédie, but also about the arts and crafts. The latter may have been wrapped up with myth, folklore, and superstition, but they were still essential to the rational life of man, so these were also added to the Encyclopédie. Everything from the past which served some purpose, or which could be made to serve some purpose within the rational enlightenment model of reality, was critically examined, and reworked to fit what was intended to become a new understanding of man and his place in a new world of reason. A new understanding of how man might live.

I wrote in the article ‘Logical Modality in Classical Athens’ that there are in fact two logical modalities present in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. Aristotle is mostly (though not always) concerned with the modality which has come down to us as the basis of formal logic. Plato is clearly aware of this modality, but, though no modern academic has dared to identify the other modality as logical, it is. It is simply that to us, it does not describe relationships which should be described as logical. Plato  talks about this other logical modality several times, in the Republic and in the Timaeus. It is connected with the doctrine of wholes and totalities, and is the basis of explaining how things may participate in other things, which is not a pattern of ideas which fits with Aristotle’s general understanding of logic.*9

Why is this important? Simply put, it matters because it is the basis of the Greek understanding of how transcendent reality relates to secular and physical existence, which was a matter of great significance up to the middle of the first millennium B.C.E, and beyond.  The doctrine underpins the understanding of the divine as something which can be both transcendent, and immanent, and thus be present in existence. *10 *11 It also points to a rather strange conclusion about the nature of the reality in which we live and think.*12

It might be imagined therefore that this doctrine would be the subject of a great deal of scholarship. In fact there is very little on the subject. The dialogues in which the doctrine appears have been written about endlessly over the last two centuries, but, though Plato’s discussion is noted, the fact that his discussion is based on an alternate logical modality is not acknowledged, and the conclusions which might follow from treating it as such, do not follow, and are therefore not discussed. It is treated as it is often presented by Plato – as mathematical and geometrical metaphors for how things might possess some form of congruence with each other.

I've argued elsewhere that there is, in general, very little appetite for attempting to understand Plato in his own terms.*13  When he talks about transcendent reality, this is treated as some sort of literary fiction, which has no necessary properties of its own. When Plato talks about the Forms, this also is treated as a species of literary fiction, which Plato records as being demolished in his Parmenides and in the Sophist. When Plato discusses the soul (in the Timaeus), it turns out that it is something which has the property of being connected with the Form of the Good, and so he argues that knowledge is acquired by the activation of that connection. We have forgotten what we knew (apparently) through the shock of physical birth, but it is possible for us to reacquire this knowledge by looking to the one true thing.*14 

Deriving all knowledge from the Form of the Good is also seen as a bafflingly impenetrable notion to the modern mind, since Plato talks about ascending purely in the mind from Form to Form, and then descending back to the world of physical reality, Form by Form, and says this is the only way to acquire genuine knowledge. How can real knowledge be acquired in this way? Why should Plato argue like this?  How can any of this make sense to us?

It makes very little sense to us, because we have lost the original doctrinal context of his discussions, and we are not that interested in attempting to recover what we can of that context, even for the purposes of a better scholarly understanding of what he is talking about. So the study of Plato languishes lifeless in the seminar room, taught and discussed from generation to generation by people who have no clear idea of what Plato meant. Books and papers are published, which clear up a minor detail here, discuss another one there, but do not leave us much the wiser.

We can understand the range of existing discussion about Plato in terms of what scholars do not or cannot understand about Plato, and their attempts to fit what they think they understand about his work into some kind of modern frame. It is their minds, and the categories of their own understanding which create the problem, not the obscurity of Plato’s ideas.

One of the principal reasons we cannot easily understand Plato is down to the loss of an understanding of that alternative logical modality. That understanding needs to be restored, along with a basic comprehension of why it is important. Not just for our understanding of Plato himself, but also for our understanding of his cultural context; the context in which philosophy was understood to be of inestimable value; and also for an understanding of some very strange things about the ancient world, which are all the stranger because (it seems) they made sense in antiquity (sacrifice, divination, idolatry, prophecy, omens, oracles, etc.).

One of the most valued books in my library is Religion and Magic: Approaches and Theories, which is a survey of modern anthropological thought. *15 The author is Graham Cunningham, a specialist in the ancient Near East and the relevant languages. Anthropology is a relatively young discipline, though crowded with many points of view. *16 Cunningham’s book covers the whole range of these, at least in terms of summarising the views of those who first suggested those theoretical approaches. He divides the approaches into several sections, which are:
1 German pioneers, 2 Early Intellectualist approaches, 3 Emotionalist approaches, 4 Phenomenological Approaches, 5 Structural Functional Approaches, 6 Symbolic Approaches, 7 Recent Intellectualist Approaches, 8 Structural approaches, 9 Cognitive Approaches, 10  Feminist Approaches.
All of these approaches were developed and used without any meaningful distinction being made between ancient cultural phenomena and cultural phenomena of modern times. I write carefully here, since there are unpleasant presumptions in the discipline of anthropology, which have not yet been rooted out. Anthropology as a formal subject was founded in the early nineteenth century, and the presumptions of the time are necessarily locked into the work of the pioneers. Many of these can be called into the light of day if you scratch the modern anthropologist in the course of discussion. The fact is that a dangerous equation was early made between the cultures of antiquity and the world of  'the primitive and the savage' in the modern world (which the Classicist D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson referred to as ‘running folklore to the death’).*17

So Cunningham’s book covers two centuries of thought about culture, civilization, religion, magic and ritual. All premised on the assumptions, understanding and categories of knowledge of those living and working in those two centuries. Nothing about those matters is covered from earlier centuries. It is as if the study of human culture, human thought, and the nature of man himself, began only in Hegel’s study, and nothing of worth came before Hegel. *18 

I could digress here, and lay out what came before in detail, but that is for another time. I will allow myself to say that Plato had something else to bring to the party, which is not covered in Cunningham’s survey; the Neoplatonists (who thought of themselves as Platonists, but we will not let them be what they are) would have brought the same thing to the party, as would some of the early Gnostic writers. The Platonists of the Italian and English Renaissances also understood what Plato was writing about, at least for the most part, and would be shocked that, not only do we not understand Plato, but that we have chosen to explain much of human culture in terms of a fundamental conceptual error about the way reality works, and with a complete disregard for the way the human mind was once understood to engage with that reality.

It is assumed by the moderns (in the west, at least) that philosophy is a cultural phenomenon which, in historical terms, follows on from religious thought, and does not precede it. We are sure of this because we are sure we know what religion is, and what philosophy is. We think that religion enshrines a form of knowledge about the world and the universe which is less than rational, and that the devotees of religion are often credulous. Religious thought is often transfixed by the numinous and the invisible, and its responses to these things are unfathomable to the rational mind. We also think religion, to a great extent, developed in response to the ideological needs of social groups, sometimes in conflict with other social groups, which can give very distinctive structures to the myths and rituals which become part of the bedrock of the public show of these religions.We believe this (admittedly oversimplified) picture to be a correct interpretation of what religion is. Modern religion differs from ancient religion only in details.

Whereas philosophy is about a critical and rational understanding of the world and how it presents itself to us. Religion is cast as an un-philosophical and irrational understanding of that reality. The development of philosophy represents progress.

These notions are subject to nuance of course, but this is the core of the enlightenment idea of what these things are.

We assume that religion, as it presents itself to us in the form of the relatively young Abrahamic religions, is not fundamentally different in nature to other religions, either elsewhere now, or in the distant past. We make such an assumption, because there is nothing in our understanding of other religions which suggests to us, at least not with any clarity, that any other process is active in the creation and operation of religion. The dynamics are the same, and the functions are the same.

Graham Cunningham’s postscript makes it clear that religion is generally understood by anthropologists to be a relic of an earlier time where rational thought was absent. Certainly in terms of what we would recognise. Somehow religion is still with us, because large parts of the human race believe in the importance and efficacy of belief in the divine: that belief in the reality of the divine is something which is essential to the religious life, and the religious understanding of reality. *19

Yet this is not what ancient writers tell us. They tell a different story, as I’ve suggested, and one which is not represented by any current anthropological approach. That different story is that religion in the ancient world was not about belief, but concerned both knowledge and conjecture about the nature of the divine; and about the nature of reality itself.*20

I prefer to write about ancient religion in terms of divine cult. I distinguish the two for clarity - religion is often understood in the modern world in terms of sociological and ideological functions. And indeed religion has these functions: it often provides social cohesion, ideology, and useful rules of social behaviour. But to attempt to explain the core of divine cult in such terms is presumptive. If the core of a divine cult involves rational conjecture about the nature of reality itself, we will not easily find this out, even if the evidence is screaming this at us. In antiquity the ritual practice of divine cult was often a private affair, rather than a public one, which implies an important division between the performative function of ritual, and the outward show. Ritual and observance were the important things. The public show might echo the thought behind the cult in some respects, and offer clues to its significance and nature, but it is not the cult itself. *21

The association of knowledge with the core divine cult (and, consequently, a confirmation of the  connection of the cult with the divine itself), gave the rituals of ancient religion (both private and public) their efficacy, and patterned their meaning. But this did not involve belief.  Belief is something which is not supported by credible argument, or is a step beyond the limits of an rational argument.  That is not what was involved in ancient discussion of questions concerning the divine. Can you have knowledge without rational modes of thought? And what did the ancient writers mean by knowledge of the divine, and by equating knowledge with the divine? Clearly, it is not possible to have actual knowledge of something without rational modes of thought. But what rational thought is, is another one of those things which we are quite clear about in modern times, even if the evidence points to a different conclusion, and exists in teeming quantities.

___

 1. Frazer wrote this in his prize essay of 1879 on the 'Growth and Development of Plato's Ideal Theory'. Published finally in 1930. I'd found this essay after noticing that there were odd features in the structure of The Golden Bough. I wrote about this in J. G. Frazer and the Platonic Theory of Being (2016), and also in the more compact essay 'Frazer and the Association of Ideas', published in Understanding Ancient Thought (2017).
2. In his 'Life of Pythagoras' Porphyry tells us that Pythagoras travelled extensively around the Near East and Egypt in the service of Cyrus. Discussed in 'Pythagoreanism, the Divine, and the Nature of Eternity'.
 3. In the Timaeus. Discussed in 'The Platonic Theory of Being' (full text with notes). Originally published in The Sacred History of Being (2015).
4. Discussed in 'Solon in the Court of Croesus' (extract). The full text is a chapter in The Sacred History of Being (2015).
5. Discussed in 'Working Wonders: Hephaestus and the Armour of Achilles'. A retitled chapter from The Sacred History of Being (2015), originally titled  'Being in Homer'.
 6. Discussed in 'Oannes and the Instruction of Mankind', which is one of the appendices to The Sacred History of Being (2015).
7 Discussed in 'The Babylonian Creation': an extract from the chapter 'Creation' in The Sacred History of Being (2015).
 8. Modern scholars are well aware of this. Ancient historians arranged information, but also questioned it. The Assyrians seemed to have a similar attitude to their materials - the chronicles associated with Ashurbanipal's reign exist in more than one version, with events recorded in a different order.
 9. Discussed in 'Logical Modality in Classical Athens' which is a chapter in Understanding Ancient Thought (2017).
10. Consequently this ought to be a matter of interest to Christian theologians, owing to the importance of the idea of the incarnation of the divine in the Gospels. For centuries the incarnation has been presented as a mystery (to both believers and theologians), without any kind of theoretical basis. But the theoretical basis is present in ancient literature, in various places. It even surfaces in a text in the Nag Hammadi documents.
 11. The logical basis of the incarnation is discussed in 'The Keys of the Kingdom: Binding and Loosing in Heaven and Earth', a chapter from Echoes of Eternity (2020).
12. Discussed in 'The Transcendental understanding of Reality', and in 'The Greek Ontological Model in the 1st Millennium B.C.E.'  from Echoes of Eternity (2020).
13.  'The Sweet Song of Swans'. The full text of this chapter, which concerns (among other things) the modern creation of the Greeks as the originators of philosophy, was published in the The Sacred History of Being (2015).
 14. In the chapter 'Plato's Theory of Vision', from The Sacred History of Being (2015). This extract concerns the discussion of the cosmos as “a perceptible God made in the image of the Intelligible.”
 15. Cunningham, Graham, Religion & Magic: Approaches & Theories, Edinburgh University Press, 1999.
 16. That there are so many conflicting views might suggest that perhaps few, or even none of the approaches are correct, but are simply the product of the failure to grasp the sophistication of ancient thought.
17. Discussed in 'Running Folklore to the Death', an extract from section 13 of J.G. Frazer and the Platonic Theory of Being (2016).
18. I've discussed Eriksen and Nielsens' A History of Anthropology (2001) in the chapter 'Before Anthropology', which book illustrates that modern anthropology is sometimes about how things ought to be, rather than a profound engagement with the evidence. They do however give a useful account of what came before Hegel. Published in Man and the Divine (2018).
 19  We tend to inject our presumptions about the past onto the evidence, as if common sense is a servicable tool in understanding it. It takes more than that. Discussed in 'Beyond the Religious Impulse'. Published as a chapter in Understanding Ancient Thought (2017). See also 'Distinguishing Belief and Faith', in Man and the Divine (2018).
20 A close look at Assyrian divination reports makes it clear that there was nothing mystical or vague about Assyrian queries about the future. The queries to the Sungod (Shamash) were expected to provide accurate information in response. This is because the diviners and scholars formulating the questions understood the universe to be rooted in a plenum. In which case,  all things which might be, already exist in the plenum. The diviners were therefore asking the Sungod for information which was available to the god. Twenty divinatory queries are available on the page 'Who will Appear before the City?' The concept of the plenum and its connection with the Mesopotamian story of the creation is discussed in the chapter: 'The Idea of the Plenum in Babylon'; further discussion of  the concept can be found in  'Pleroma, Cosmos, and Physical Existence', both from Understanding Ancient Thought (2017).
21. Discussed in 'Shar Kishati and the Cult of Eternity', published in Understanding Ancient Thought (2017).

Draft version, October 29, 2019. Final version, All Hallows Eve, 2019. Updated 11 January 2020. TY. 






Wednesday, 26 June 2019

Is the History of Human Thought Upside Down? Writing to an Egyptologist.




I wrote to this particular Egyptologist because I found that Daniel Richard McBride, the author of 'The Egyptian Foundations of Gnosis', had been a postgraduate student of his. McBride's work is truly extraordinary, and approaches the nature of Neoplatonic philosophy in a way no-one ever has before. Or at least since the Neoplatonists themselves, who, in late antiquity, understood ancient religion in both Egypt and Assyria as the product of philosophical thought. Iamblichus, author of the
The Mysteries of the Egyptians, Chaldeans, and Assyrians, was the most explicit exponent of this idea. 

Is this a viable understanding of the evidence? It is. And McBride's work associates ideas in Neoplatonic thought with the various Egyptian priestly colleges and their views on the divine. It is an extraordinary achievement, which (so far), has not been taken on board or even discussed, by any tenured scholars of the ancient world in the West (to my knowledge at least).

Daniel McBride used to have a website, from which it was possible to download his thesis. That disappeared a long time ago. It is still possible to find his thesis online (there is a link to the PDF file on my site), but he himself seems to have disappeared. I continue to wish to make contact with him to discuss his work and its implications. 

The Egyptologist did not reply. 

TY, June 26, 2019.

To:******@*****.edu
November 3, 2016 
Subject: Is the history of human thought upside down?



Dear ****,

Weve not met, but we may have trod something of the same path, or similar paths over the past twenty plus years.

I published a book a year ago about the idea that our intellectual history, for one reason and another, is actually upside down (The Sacred History of Being). And that the earliest history of the human race can only be understood if we understand that there was a very sophisticated level of abstract thought at the beginnings of civilisation.

My background is a heavy engagement with philosophy, both ancient and modern, from age fifteen onwards (I am now sixty years old). I was also interested in art, religion, history, and some other subjects. Eventually, in the early eighties, I noticed that there were concepts present in texts from the second millennium B.C.E. (principally in Akhenaten's 'Hymn to the Sun') which were embedded also in the philosophical writings of the Greeks from nearly a thousand years later. I understood that they shouldn't be there, if there was no sophisticated philosophical thought present in the second millennium. Iconography was also particularly revealing.

I decided in the end to major in ancient history at university (as a mature student of thirty or so), rather than philosophy, though I did some of that too. I wanted to know if I was barking up the wrong tree (I didn't think I was).

So I spent three years studying Greece, Egypt, Mesopotamia, and also Assyria, in great detail at UCL and SOAS in London (1989-92). Finding abundant evidence for the heretical idea that the human race had a profound capacity for abstract thought from the earliest times. And I became increasingly perplexed at the fact that scholars could not see what was before their eyes, or understand what the evidence actually meant.

Sometime before moving to London (I lived in Edinburgh in the eighties) I had read On the Mysteries by Iamblichus. So I was aware that the Neoplatonists had the idea that there was a common intellectual system underpinning both Assyrian and Egyptian theology. Which, by itself, suggested that there was an immense level of abstraction involved, stretching back thousands of years. And that I might, just possibly, be on the right track.

I found myself focusing on ancient Assyria while I was in London. I had already noticed the continuities between Greek and Egyptian ideas, but if Iamblichus was right, I should find the same intellectual system underpinning their theology, and the structure of their divine pantheon. I thought of that as a check on the idea that a high level of abstraction was present in both cultures.

I was not at all disappointed. And there were also direct connections between Greek and Mesopotamian thought. None of which made any sense to the historians.

[.......]

And then, in 1997 (I think), I discovered the thesis of Daniel Richard McBride, on The Egyptian Foundations of Gnosis. That had a huge impact on me.

So, if philosophy could draw on Egyptian theology, then Egyptian theology necessarily was essentially based on a series of philosophical arguments. Otherwise none of it would have made sense to the Neoplatonists.

I could go in several directions from here, but some of them might be conversations for the future. So I will confine myself to the suggestion that the Egyptians were philosophical, and concerned with abstractions, and everything around these abstractions, and that, given the antiquity of Egyptian religion, these ideas are of immense antiquity.

I have tried to contact Daniel McBride. He had a website at one point, now gone. He is referenced often, but he seems to be impossible to contact. As the supervisor of his thesis, it occurred to me that what he was writing about was something which interested you.

I know how tight Egyptology is, not least in avoiding any conflict with the classicist view that the Greeks invented philosophy. You are a working and eminent Egyptologist - I have no intention of making problems for you [....]. But I would be interested to know if we are sharing the same heresy.

My website is at: http://shrineinthesea.blogspot.co.uk/



Best regards,

Thomas Yaeger


Thursday, 28 March 2019

What We Have Lost, and How the Ancient Concept of the Cosmos Died





[Extract from correspondence with a specialist in ancient astronomy, on the question of why it is we are so disengaged with the concerns of the ancient world.] 

[....]

Thanks for your substantial mail, which I will work through in order, for clarity.

The day of the equinox was quite spectacular, with the full moon rising over the Pentland Hills to the south of Edinburgh. The weather has been very unsettled in the past couple of weeks, so I was not expecting to see anything.

[...]

...binding and loosing was important in Egypt also. In fact it seems to have been an idea universal in ancient civilisations. Though the basis of the idea is likely to have been the preserve of the educated, and the personnel of the divine cults (mostly, but not always exactly the same people). The core idea underlying binding and loosing is that our physical existence is, however it might look to us, a subjective perception of reality. And a subjective perception of reality is a subjective perception of Being itself.

That is why it is so difficult for scholars to understand what is going on. They see the practices and ‘beliefs’ which survive in the literary and archaeological record, but they have no frame in which to understand these things. They do not expect to find anything subtle and sophisticated, because they (they think) are dealing with forms of primitive stupidity, no matter how refined the cultural remains might appear to be.

The figure I gave for the number of offering tables recently turns out to be well out of date. The archaeological exploration of ancient Akhetaten (Tell El Amarna) continues, and the current figure is more than 790 offering tables. That is a staggering number.

You can term the perception of the cosmos which largely eludes modern scholars ‘a shamanic world view’. It is a world view which is extremely old. There were always people around who could see and think beyond the here and now. But the term ‘shaman’ is relatively modern, and fills a gap in the arsenal of modern anthropology. But supplying a name for a phenomenon does not explain what is behind the shamanic practices, and the associated patterns of understanding.

Once the inextricable link between the physical world and the reality beyond became part of the ancient mindset (probably from an immemorial time), it becomes obvious that what happens in Heaven has an effect on Earth, and vice versa. This explains a lot about Buddhist thought, which I’ve spent some time studying over the years. Recently I wrote an article on the possible influence of Buddhism on the philosophy of David Hume. The article explores the logic involved in Theravara Buddhism in some detail.  Theravara Buddhism isn’t a close analogue with with Mesopotamian and Egyptian thought, but it arises from a similar perception of what Reality itself is. The article also discusses ideas prevalent in the European Enlightenment (mainly in the context of Diderot’s Encylopedia, which explain much about negative attitudes to ancient thought in the eighteenth century). The Enlightenment of David Hume.

How was the ancient perception of the nature of the cosmos lost, and why? That’s two very large questions! Asking about the consequences of that loss is another big question. You know lots of stuff about that already, I know. But a discursive triangulation on this question between us, is likely to be useful for us both. This may take some time.

I’ve been writing about that loss for a long time, since it became obvious early on that it was necessary to understand the trajectory, the context, and the mechanics of the loss (in some detail), if we were to be able to (properly) understand what was actually lost.

As far as the savants of the European Enlightenment were concerned, the entire history of the human race before the eighteenth century was a morass of irrational thought – mythology, folklore, magic, legions of superstitious beliefs, a general credulity in the human race, and in earlier times, murderous ritual. They thought they could get clear of all of that by the rigorous application of common sense. That was the basis of Diderot’s Encyclopedia. So, the enoblement of common sense is one of the factors in the loss of the ancient world view.

It is hard to entirely blame the savants, given the limited information that they had. To them the past seemed to be a grim and dark place. They understood that even the crafts were wrapped around in superstition. But the crafts remained important for the wellbeing of the human race. So the crafts were described in the Encyclopedia, but shorn of anything which wasn’t entirely practical.

The savants often did not read and know ancient literature. So they did not know much that was worth knowing. That’s one of the problems with common sense: if the solution is common sense, that is already in your head. Reading is irrelevant. 

Common sense of course, when you are dealing with something which is transcendent of human experience and understanding, is entirely inappropriate. Common sense dictated that the transcendent did not exist, and served no purpose in understanding our world.

The loss of understanding has been going on for a very long time, and was already under way in the 2nd Millennium BCE. This island is dotted with stone circles as you know, but the ancient Britons stopped building them around the 14th century BCE. So something, some conception was lost, which removed the motive for building them.

I read a chapter of your writing about the esoteric recently, which was essentially sound. But it isn’t the case that esoteric knowledge in the ancient world was not deliberately kept as a secret. The various priesthoods and sages might have wished that every living person should know what it is, but because esoteric knowledge is often puzzling and counterintuitive in nature, it is easy for what it is to be misunderstood, and then reconstituted as something else. Knowledge which is misunderstood is worse than no knowledge at all. 

I think that is the general pattern of the loss of understanding. Some insight into the nature of reality itself is achieved by an individual, and that insight is taught. An entire culture is developed on the bedrock of that insight. Then it is taught badly, or taught to those who cannot understand what they are being told. The insight becomes something other than what it actually is, and then serves some other cultural or social function. Once a culture is on that slope, it is hard to put the slide into reverse.

I can give some examples here, plus pointers to articles in which I’ve discussed the disconnects between ancient and modern understanding.

First, the ontological argument, which constitutes a huge obstacle to an understanding of ancient thought about the divine. The principal problem with the modern ontological argument is that, for the past seven or eight centuries or so, the argument has been formulated on the basis of the notion that the property of ‘existence’ indicates that something is real. Which is why the argument attempts to provide credible grounds for saying that God exists, and is therefore real. Which is tantamount to a denial of transcendent reality, or the transcendent nature of god. There are other issues with the argument.

I discussed both Anselm’s and Descartes’ versions in The Sacred History of Being, and an extract from the article on Descartes is at: The Ontological Argument In Descartes.  

How did the Christian church, and the philosophers, make this mistake? Probably because they were afraid of the unbounded, the limitless, and the concept of infinity. They wanted an omniscient and perfect entity as their god, but not one that was necessarily beyond human fathoming, and wrapped around in puzzles and paradoxes. They were making God in their own image, rather than the other way around.

I’ve written about the history of the idea of infinity in mathematics, religion and philosophy, via a critical review of Adrian W Moore’s BBC radio series on the subject, broadcast in 2016. My review identifies what is missing from Moore’s tendentious argument.  A long read, but worth the time, I think. It shows just how much pain and intellectual difficulty the idea of the infinite can cause the human mind: ‘Evading the Infinite’

They still had the notion that God lay somewhere behind the physical world, but that notion was not a very sophisticated one. They didn’t need a sophisticated version of God any more, since the main function of religion in the West, from sometime before the fall of Rome, was to support temporal power. 

Divines in the early modern period ended up splitting into two major factions. The Theists saw the world as the creation of God, and that God could be petitioned by Man. Though they had by this time lost all understanding of the mechanism which might make this connection possible. The other major faction was the Deists, who conceived that God had created the world, but that God was the prime mover, and once the world and the cosmos was set in motion, he did not interfere. This view took hold particularly after Descartes and Newton, and the regularity of the motions of the heavenly bodies was then taken to be evidence of the existence of God (this view became known as uniformitarianism, meaning that the forces which were in play in the past, are the same ones which are at play now. The implication is that everything can be calculated).

Much of this is down to early modern misreadings of Aristotle from the 12th century CE onwards, and his notion of ‘substance’ (ousia). When is Aristotle talking about matter, or about Being, and/or Reality itself? In the Middle Ages they weren’t very sure. The earlier Arian controversy in the 4th century CE also revolved around substance (is God one or Triune? They decided that God was Triune – ‘Father, Son and Holy Ghost’ - but the component parts ‘were of the same substance.’ (homousia) What that common substance actually was, was never established in Christian doctrine (and the trinitarian view of God is still not accepted by all Christians). The triadic nature of the divine in Christianity is something which has its origins in Egyptian religion. It’s a feature of Christian theology because the ‘Father, Son and Holy Ghost’ are mentioned in the Old Testament. Just without the political fudge of the homousia, which is the legacy of the Council of Nicaea, held in 325 CE.
   
Reliance on Aristotle as a guide always was an error of judgement among scholars. He sometimes argues something other than what he actually thinks (he wrote a book on rhetoric, the Sophistical Refutations), and clearly sometimes actively intended to mislead his students. A case in point is his Nicomachean Ethics, the argument of which proposes that the Gods, by their nature are wholly contemplative, and cannot engage in the world.  Which is an odd and essentially heretical kind of argument to make in the late 4th Century BCE. The book is a series of lecture notes, probably by different hands (there is an obvious duplication in the text in Book 8). We know that Aristotle held different classes in the morning, and in the afternoon. In the morning he taught exoteric knowledge, in the afternoon he taught esoteric knowledge. The notes on ethics must come from his exoteric teaching, since the argument arrives at, what was at the time, a nonsensical conclusion.

Why would Aristotle do this? The point of spending time building a painstaking argument that leads to a nonsensical conclusion is to find out who the intelligent students are in your class: the intelligent ones are those who pick at the inconsistencies and absurdities of your argument. Those are the ones who you allow to move on to study esoteric thought. Something like this procedure is still used by tribal elders in Africa: you ask a question about the gods, and they give you what sounds like a plausible reply. But it isn’t the real one. The student will only get the real reply once he has shown he is no fool. And that takes a lot more questions on the subject.

Aristotle’s greatest and most dangerous legacy to us also comes ultimately from his exoteric teachings, and is a main cause of our intellectual exile from antiquity. These are his Laws of thought. These Laws became the basis of formal logic as we understand it in the modern world, and they are also the basis of much theological argumentation from the middle ages onwards. Aristotle did not write a treatise on the laws of thought – the various component parts are mentioned and described in his Metaphysics. Put in the most simple way, The first is the Law of Identity (a thing is itself, and not something else), the second is the Law of Non-Contradiction (a thing cannot be one thing and another thing at the same time); the third is the Law of the Excluded Middle (a thing cannot be halfway between what it is and something else).

You can see that the laws revolve around the idea of identity. But it is a purely secular conception of identity, not at all applicable to something which is transcendent.  If you accept the universality of these laws, you cannot discuss the transcendent in any meaningful sense, even if you have academic tenure in a theological seminary. And it is entirely impossible to understand anything useful about ancient religion and ritual, except in purely phenomenological terms.

I have pointed out however that an alternative logical modality has come down to us in the pages of Plato (in the Timaeus), and it is this one which illuminates ancient religion and philosophy. The Neoplatonist writers referenced it. The account of this modality in Plato is rarely discussed by specialists, in terms of what it is and what it means, though it is often read, since Plato’s Timaeus is a text often set for students. Detail available in: Logical Modality in Classical Athens. You might find it interesting then to read The Greek Ontological Model in the 1st Millennium B.C.E.

Though the idea of Being was discussed in classical Greece, by Parmenides and Plato, as well as the Presocratics, the idea was not much discussed in late antiquity, except by the Neoplatonists from the third century CE onwards (Proclus, Iamblichus, Porphyry, Olympiodorus and Plotinus, and some others). But very few outside of their circles were paying attention at the time. Their moment came as late as the Italian Renaissance. And then they were lost sight of once again after the Newtonian revolution.

So the ideas of the Divine as coterminous with Reality itself, and that Reality itself was entirely transcendent in nature, dropped out of philosophical discourse within the Church. It was not picked up again by philosophers in the early modern period. Hence the endless and vacuous discussions about whether or not God could be said to have the property of existence.

With the advent of the European Enlightenment, the history of human thought began to be written about again in detail, for the first time since Diogenes Laertius wrote his Lives of the Philosophers. But the rewriting was done on the basis of certain presumptions. It was axiomatic that abstract ideas,  such as Being,  were difficult things to discuss, and it was agreed that the Greeks had been the first to do this, during the middle of the first millennium BCE. Why was this decided? The evidence for the Greeks was unquestionably in the surviving texts. Whereas it was decided that there was no evidence that other cultures had ever risen to such levels of discussion.

At the time, it could be argued, it would have been difficult to have come to any other conclusion. Several ancient writers however, had suggested that philosophy was an immensely old discipline, including Plato and Clement of Alexandria. Clement even gave a list of the cultures who practised the discipline. Both Diogenes Laertius and Aristotle suggested that it might have had an origin elsewhere. Aristotle suggested that it required a relatively leisured professional class to emerge, by which he probably had the Egyptians in mind. Isocrates (a rival to Plato, and actively opposed to Plato’s outlook) mentioned the Egyptians in connection with philosophy four times. These statements were (and still are) dismissed.

The European Enlightenment marks the point where the Egyptians ancient reputation as philosophers was systematically downgraded by German scholars (documented in detail in Martin Bernal’s Black Athena). In the end it was agreed that the Egyptians dealt in terms of concrete ideas (whatever that means), and consequently were not capable of abstract thought, and were not capable of contemplating ideas of a wholly transcendent level of reality. Even now, Egyptologists refer to ancient Egyptians as ‘pragmatic’ (as opposed to philosophical) in the way they thought about their religion and rituals.

All this was done in order to preserve the Enlightenment fiction of a stupendous achievement of the Greeks in the middle of the 1st Millennium BCE, by isolating and downgrading contemporary cultures which might have influenced their development.

Over the past 170 years, an enormous amount of evidence has come out of the ground, and quite a lot of it suggests (to those who are awake at least) that philosophy, transcendental thought, and a sophisticated concept of Being was at the root of a number of cultures around the Mediterranean and the Near East. However Egyptologists (in particular) just ignore this evidence as irrelevant to their profession. Most classicists do too, but with some of them, the dam is starting to break.

That’s the short answer to your question…. There is much more, however, which I will skip for the moment. Where are we going on this long trajectory? I had an exchange of mails with a friend in San Francisco in 2015, where we discussed this question.  I took out personal stuff from the exchange, anonymised her, and turned it into an article which is on my website. I will point you at that.  Locke, Newton, and the Rejection of Reality.

I entirely agree with you that the materialistic paradigm necessarily results in the denial of the possible non-locality of consciousness. If you think that thought and consciousness itself are the products of biological processes in the brain, the idea that consciousness is not localised in the human head just sounds like so much nonsense.  The non-locality of consciousness has been a subject for a few philosophers over the years, but is not discussed in terms of the paradigm which we clearly have in common. P. F. Strawson was one, Wittgenstein was another (Strawson was influenced by Wittgenstein’s thought). Among philosophers it is generally referenced as the ‘no-ownership’ model of consciousness. Usually the argument is along the lines of: “we are constricted to think as we are about identity, perception, experience, physicality, location, etc., by the limitations of (apparently) being physical entities in space and time. Which may not actually be the case”. Not much fun to read, but at least they understand that a materialist interpretation of human existence is problematic.

I also agree that there is a lot of evidence which suggests that consciousness is not localised in the brain, or associated with matter at all. Consciousness may interact with matter, and have some kind of interface with the material world, but that is not the same as being a phenomenon which is entirely localisable. There is a two-way traffic, as you said earlier in your mail.

For me I understand this to be possible because things which are apparently in different places, are actually together in one place, which I reference as the plenum. Which is a place which is not localisable. It is also the key idea we have lost, which makes it impossible to understand both reality itself, and the representations of it, in which we live.

The implication of the concept of reality being a plenum (as it was understood in antiquity) is that both God and gods are necessarily real. This is the consequence of the way they were defined. Each of them has an excellence special to them. That excellence is what makes them real. The plenum is itself real because it is complete and perfect in itself [...]. This fundamental idea is what underpins Greek and Assyrian conceptions of the importance of excellence in thought and activity. It is also why excellence in craft skills was venerated in antiquity. Excellence is what connects everything with everything else. It is why the perfect  execution and observance of a ritual or ceremony was regarded as the most important thing to achieve. This pattern of ideas served as a model among the Greeks for the human soul, and to the organization of society, discussed at: Justice and the Harmony of the Soul. Excellence was also what gave access to the divine: Excellence and the Knowledge of Divine Things.

So I accept that consciousness can be understood as a bridge between ourselves as we are in the form of finite representations, and what we are in that place (which is paradoxically no place) which is filled with the complete and the perfect.  And I agree with you that an important aspect of ritual is about facilitating traffic between the worlds. As you suggest, the traffic is a bit constricted now, since many fewer people have any conception of this purpose…. However, it is necessary for ritual to be performed, and observance to be made, but not essential for the process to be fully understood for it to have an effect. There are still people performing rituals and observances.
   
I read somewhere (in what I’ve read of your work so far), that myth is often about travelling to that other place, either by ascending to Heaven, or descending to an underworld (actually the same place, the plenum, just dressed differently). I agree. [...] The creation of a myth, and the telling of it, can be understood as performative also, particularly if rituals are associated with it: it is ritual made visible. Placing myths in the sky, to descend into the earth, and to rise from it once again, as part of a regular cycle, like a rotating Tibetan prayer wheel, is performative and served the same function.  

Best, Thomas







Thursday, 19 July 2018

The Greek Ontological Model in the 1st Millennium B.C.E.





This is a discussion of the ontology and theology of the Greeks, in the context of the 1st Millennium B.C.E. It is essentially an overview of where I was, written between 26 July and the 3rd of August 2003. I have revised some of the English, and excised a couple of short passages, but the argument remains as it was. It is quite a long read (around six thousand words), but some readers will find the discussion rewarding and worth the effort. It has a number of themes, but essentially it is a discursive account of Plato as a theological writer. 

It is divided into six sections, which I list here:

Abstract and Introduction
Where is the Theology of the Greeks?
Discovering Greek Theology
The Intellectual basis of Greek Theology
Magic and Ontology in Ancient Greece
Beyond Motion and Change


Abstract

This essay proposes a substantial revision to the current cultural model for the Greeks. It argues that we need to modify our picture of the ontological model available to the Greeks in this period, and consequently to adjust the corresponding ontological model we use to interpret the cultural significance of their religious thought and practice. It also attempts to rearrange some of the fractured pieces of the Greek cultural continuum into a more appropriate set of relationships.


Introduction


This essay is, in contemporary parlance, ‘left field’, in that it does not develop a current line of argument about Greek civilisation, but instead proposes a very radical re-interpretation of the Greek cultural phenomenon. It does this, not because the author wishes to wilfully and contrarily reorder the phenomenon, but because the author has been pushed toward a radical re-interpretation by the evidence itself for the understanding of ancient Greece over a period of twenty years: this evidence suggests that the ontology available to the Greeks themselves in the 1st Millennium B.C.E. was much more sophisticated than we have hitherto allowed ourselves to imagine. As a whole, the phenomenon of philosophy (and its sudden appearance) in Greece is problematic in its broad relationship to a number of aspects of the Greek cultural matrix (with which it has a number of clear connections), and there has been no recent serious attempt to address these issues. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine in what circumstances within the academic world of classics such radical re-interpretation would be possible. Plus there is the question of who has the responsibility and expertise to start playing around with the ontology of the Greeks – the philosophers or the classicists?

So this is a radical little text, dealing with a cultural no-man’s land, which is unlikely to find an orthodox home in a journal such as JCS or JHS, or any of the others. Too bad! It is nonetheless a serious piece of work which I think deserves at least a little attention, in that its radical re-ordering of the Greek cultural matrix  offers the possibility of understanding the theological background to the development of, for example, participatory democracy in Greece – the sort of background  scholars have suspected for some considerable time - but have been unable to explore. The reason it has not been possible to explore it (it is argued in this essay) is because the ontological model we attribute to the Greeks is not the one they had.

The essay also  proposes a new way of understanding the role of sacrifice among the Greeks, and has a few new words to say on Greek conceptions of participation and magic.


Where is the Theology of the Greeks?

Much of it is in the pages of Plato. Plato is a religious writer. His writings do not tell us, as the current orthodoxy generally holds, about a secular programme of philosophical investigation. Instead his writings tell us about the theology of the Greeks. This has not been recognised much in practice and in detail by scholarship – however the later commentators all the way up to Proclus wrote their commentaries on the basis that he was writing about theology. In the renaissance they read Plato very much the same way. However we do not ourselves currently have a conception of theology or of its history which comfortably allows us to see the ideas expressed in the dialogues as evidence of theology.

The later commentators have been dismissed as insignificant to the interpretation of Plato because much of what they wrote betrays ideas of eastern origin. In other words, their theological interpretation of Plato depends on ideas which are clearly drawn from eastern sources, and on that account  their interpretations are illegitimate as a means of understanding and interpreting Plato. On this account the later Platonists are designated by us as ‘Neoplatonists’. A distinction they would not have understood.

The presumption here behind the orthodox position is that both Greek religious and theological ideas and the ideas contained in Plato are autochthonous – i.e., they don’t belong within a common cultural matrix whose boundaries across Europe and the Middle East are difficult to define. Greek ideas are Greek, and Plato’s dialogues represent an expressly Greek (and essentially  philosophical) interpretation of reality.

One of the reasons for the popularity of the autochthonous nature of Greek ideas is the easy identification of religion as the outward expression of an inward theology.  While it is true that aspects of an outward religion may (and sometimes do) reflect details of an inward theology, it is also the case that there is no necessary and obvious connection between them at a formal level (this on account of the various purposes, many of them pragmatic, which underpin the show of religion).  In other words, it is not possible to guess the nature of the theology underpinning a religious literature and its iconography simply by analysis of those things.  It has (for example) been too easily assumed that Homer tells us what we need to know about Greek religion (Plato’s view of  Homer and the other poets is well-known). But, constructing a picture of Greek theology on the basis of the descriptions of the Gods and their actions in Homer results in a morally unsatisfactory result and a source of embarrassment - to the Greeks as well as ourselves. It is hard to imagine a people with the intellectual curiousity and power of the Greeks being happy to consider the Homeric epics as sufficient description and explanation of the world for any length of time, and for any serious purpose.

However, the contemporary view is that, since Plato is not writing about Homeric ideas of divinity, he cannot be telling us about Greek theology: therefore he is writing about a more or less secular programme of philosophical inquiry.

On the contrary, I repeat that Plato is writing about Greek theology, and that theology is part of a common body of philosophical theory and argumentation, orally maintained for many generations. Naturally it isn’t the case that all Greeks were familiar with the ideas which find expression in his pages, any more than a straw poll in an English street would reveal a picture of the central theological beliefs of the Church of England. But it is the case that Plato is writing about the theology of his culture, in that it reflects the body of doctrine shared by his peers.

What are the reasons for arguing that Plato is not writing about theology? Firstly, what Plato writes does not resemble closely what we now regard as theology. We don’t expect to encounter theology in a dialogue format. He deals with abstract arguments which, it seems, only occasionally admit of a theological interpretation. Discussions of the relationship between the one and the many are expressly conducted in terms of logic. And so these discussions are treated in pedagogical terms. It might be that an argument by Plato might be seen by a later writer as having a theological application, but that does not mean that Plato was discussing theology.

 Secondly, Plato is regarded as the apex of philosophical speculation in the ancient world. He did not invent philosophy, but to a significant extent invented the discipline which we now recognise as philosophy.  It is often assumed – because there appears to be no evidence to the contrary – that clear abstract thinking began with Plato. And clear understanding of ideas of infinity and the boundless, the currency of later theological speculations, also began with him (earlier philosophers such as Anaximander and Parmenides may have concerned themselves with such concepts and arguments, but they represent no more than the foreshadowings of what Plato would do. It isn’t real philosophy as we understand it).

In short, before Plato abstract speculation in the writings of the presocratics does not really count as philosophy. Certainly not as these speculations are  represented to us in the historical record. Before Plato, there is, it is assumed, no coherent logical argument about intellectual abstractions. It has been argued in fact that, before Plato, most speculation was carried out at the level of concrete images, and that concrete ideas alone were the currency of earlier ages in Greece and elsewhere.

During the past 150 years or so, the civilisations of antiquity, in cultural and intellectual terms, have been seen as a relatively new development, grown out of an ‘urdummheit’, or initial stupidity. This is not a difficult view to understand, if we do not separate out (as we now do not) the apparatus of public religious expression and the theology which gave it a legitimate life, since the credulity apparent in the ancient world, with its bizarre cults and practices, its sacrifices to the gods, its Hades and Sheols, its divine honours, suggests a degree of unreason. When read at face value, these practices do appear to indicate an intellectual capacity not yet fully formed.

Not only do we not separate the forms of religious expression from the theological underpinnings, the same doctrine of ‘urdummheit’ (mercifully no longer an axiomatic premise in the study of the ancient world) has left us with no conception of an ancient theology, beyond whatever poor thing might be assumed (usually something convenient to our own assumptions) to lurk inside the outward show. It is not there, because it cannot be there -  the intellectual capacity necessary for philosophy and abstract theology was not developed until the middle of the first millennium B.C.E.


Discovering Greek Theology


We have to interpret the evidence of the past on the basis of what we already know about the world. How we pass beyond what we know to an understanding of something which, beforehand, we did not understand, is still a process which involves a degree of mystery. In some way the categories of our understanding have to be modified by the perplexing experience of evidence which takes us beyond the structures already established in our minds (and in the academic curriculum). Despite the best efforts of Francis Bacon to formalise the process of intellectual invention, we still cannot mechanise this, and cannot prescribe how it is that we go from one intellectual model of the subject in question, to a better one. But a better model is what is required.

The ancients (including Plato) have been accused of mistaking a subjective ontology for an objective one (Both J.G. Frazer and Benjamin Jowett approached Plato from this point of view). In other words, they were accused of making a fundamental mistake in their understanding of the world, and that this is the principal difference between us and them – by contrast we do not make this particular ontological mistake. Consequently it is all too easy for us to treat their conceptions as if they were struggling to deal with the kind of epistemological and ontological questions which are of importance to us, and which make sense within our own ontological model of reality – practical questions of understanding physical issues  – how do we know what a thing is, and understand its relations with other things in the world; how we understand and delineate ‘real’ (phenomenal) things; how we deal with things on a rational basis; how we avoid thinking about phenomena in faulty ways. And so on. When the Greeks address abstract metaphysical questions, such as whether the Good is one or many, we behave as if they failed to understand the limits of philosophical enquiry.

On the contrary it is we who traduce their ontology. They were not talking about the phenomenal world as an ontological structure (not until the advent of Stoicism as a doctrine and a practical view of life from the 5th century B.C.E. onwards, in both Greece and, it would seem, Egypt). They were talking about what they regarded as reality itself, which (they presumed) underpins the phenomenal world.

Though we cannot formalise the process of changing ontological models, we can say something about the process, and what it involves.  A subjective ontology is one which is held within the mind, and is assumed to describe to an accurate degree the reality which is being apprehended. Which in this case is the material and textual evidence from ancient Greece. Discovering the difference between a subjective and an objective ontology depends on observation of the limits of the subjective ontology in explaining what is observed. 

Where there is a discrepancy, there is likely to be a deficiency in (at the least) the ontological description. An obvious example of this phenomenon is the long-standing and highly successful account of the planetary motions by the astronomer and geographer Ptolemy, which provided a reasonably practical  mathematical description of what was observed from the earth, but did not come close to describing the real motions of the planets. Even when the ontology is adjusted to more accurately describe the observed reality, it may be that the revised theoretical model only accounts satisfactorily for what is observed at the level of mathematical description, without actually addressing the real nature of the phenomena.  Sometimes no amount of revision of the description is adequate: sometimes the model has to be changed.

It follows therefore, that if the ontology we give the Greeks, and the ancients in general, is significantly faulty, then there ought to be evidence within both the written record, the monumental record, and the archaeological record, which is not easily (or at all) accommodated by the existing model. As a general description, the existing model may be satisfactory for our contemporary purposes, but it does not satisfactorily account for all the available detail, and more importantly, account for the significance accorded to the detail in the ancient world. For example, we often account for ancient religious belief and practice in terms of ideology and propaganda, but this leaves out a detailed accounting of the perceived intrinsic worth of these ideas in the ancient world, and their contemporary context. The presumption appears to be that it is simply uneccessary to address these details in such terms.

There ought also to be deformations in the history of the apprehension of the Greeks (their reception), as a result of the struggle to make sense of their civilization within the categories we choose as a means to understand it. There is of course such evidence. Martin Bernal has dealt with much of the history of the revised scholarly model of Greece developed from the eighteen-forties onwards, (and in an exemplary fashion) in the first volume of Black Athena, which was received more warmly by the academic community than might have been expected. However Bernal’s work was intended to open up the territory, not to close the book on a bad period for the study of antiquity in Europe. At the moment we are in an interesting place, in that the former model of antiquity created by scholars no longer holds sway, but most of its parts are still in place to stave off undesirable vacuum. Many questions need to be answered still about the development of the scholars model, and about the traduction of the intellectual world of antiquity which resulted. The evidence remains, but is now no longer securely framed by the labours of 150 years of scholarship which produced a collusive and fictional tale of ‘how it was’. The anomalies in the evidence are still a legitimate subject for academic enquiry. But now they should be apprehended as far as possible as they are., as they present themselves, and explained as far as possible in terms of the culture which gave rise to them.

Systematic study of this anomalous evidence ought to lead us to a more precisely tailored ontology for the Greeks and the ancients, by suggesting an alternative hypothesis upon which (all) the evidence might rest.  In the course of such a study we should remember that the anomalous nature of some of the evidence from ancient Greece arises from the curious way it sits within our own models of the past – not because this evidence is intrinsically intrusive, violating the cultural context in which it is found.

Some of the anomalies are within particular bodies of evidence. For instance, the Platonic dialogues, read as philosophy, contains many pieces of information which are not easily integrated within modern analyses of his work which see that work within the frame of a research or teaching programme, for which there is no evidence. There must have been teaching of some sort in the Academy, but we have no idea about the nature of that teaching, and all current models depend on retrojections of later notions about philosophical pedagogy in Greece.

The work of other ancient writers is similarly unhappy at being interpreted in terms of a model of philosophical activity which depends ultimately on later conceptions of what it is to do philosophy, and in which, through long practice, scholars have become comfortable with sidelining the context and much of the detail of the texts. Not to mention the now dubious practice of emendation which has gone on since the recovery of classical texts in the renaissance (cf Scaliger’s commitment to ‘extreme scholarship’ in the ‘reconstruction’ of Aristotle’s Greek from an Arabic translation).

 Other anomalies arise in details of description and practice. Some of these seem to be satisfactorily explained in terms of the ‘urdummheit’ model, in that they are explained in terms of the failure to be something like ourselves. Examples might be the use of oracles, the consultation of entrails, the notice given to omens and the practice of divination, the honour and worship directed at statues and images, as well as the worship of ancestors and the dead, the importance of liturgy and ritual, the emphasis on completion and perfection, the ubiquitous practice of animal sacrifice, the attribution of the sacred to inanimate things, and the prevalence of the view that the detail of the world is almost entirely conditioned by ends.

These things, which seem like a disparate array of ancient peculiarities (and are so treated by and large by modern scholars), are in fact tied together as a set of practices and phenomena by an underlying body of ideas. Within that body of ideas they make sense. The varieties of practice and phenomena are intelligible as the development of an intellectual apprehension of reality, in a manner paralleled by the development of ideas and practices in our own intellectual world.

This intellectual apprehension of reality is in fact what ancient theology is.

Much of this theology can be obtained through a careful reading of Plato’s Timaeus and the Parmenides. However there are other texts which contain rich information about the same body of ideas. Plato’s the Sophist and the Theatetus, and the Republic are others. Aristotle’s On Generation and Corruption is another one of these works. The Enneads of Plotinus, despite their relatively late date, give perhaps the clearest picture of the theology shorn of the context of disputation found in the Platonic Dialogues.

The essence of Greek theology is an intellectual apprehension of the ground of reality, of the ultimate reality, as being beyond all categorisation and apprehension. This ultimate reality, though one, is also twofold, in that while it gives rise to all subsequent manifestations and shadows of its nature, it also remains as itself, abiding and unseen; above all participation in the world it generated.

This is the both the ultimate reality and the ultimate target of intelligence. It is both unformed and the repository of all possible forms. It is chaos in a sense, in that it is beyond all human reduction to order, but it embraces all reality in potential.

It is also the ultimate ground of power: the source to which all things must look for renewal. All intermediary sources which can renew the power of an entity, practice, phenomenon or idea, also draw power ultimately from the principal source.

It is also the place where the same and the different meet. All distance is collapsed in the ultimate ground of reality. Opposites are one, and the most distant objects are in the most intimate contact. The beginning and end of time are conjoined and inseparable.

This is the essence of the ideas enshrined in Greek theology.

Initiation into the theology was by the method illustrated by Plato in his dialogues – through the insufficiency of logic and argument to pin down the ultimate reality as other than something which utterly transcends the categories of human description and understanding, and which is in fact beyond all description and all understanding.

This is the core of an ancient practice of dialectic. In itself there is little about it which can be said to be exclusively Greek, except insofar as we have great evidential detail through Plato. However, traces of the idea echo through the religious beliefs and iconography of the Greeks, once you know what to look for. It is the common occult substratum which binds together some of the most important aspects of Greek civilization.

Greek civilization, its key literature, its art, its ritual, its religious beliefs, is underpinned by a range of ways of thinking, ways of interpreting, ways of conceiving, ways of operating, and consequential ends, which all owe their validity to the common occult substratum of theology. The occult substratum did not give rise to these modes of thinking and operating (it appears to be - at least to an extent - ‘hard-wired’ into our conceptual apparatus), but informs them with meaning which they would scarcely have without it (French classical anthropologists have done excellent work in unpicking Greek cultural practice without any conception that, at some very deep level, a sophisticated philosophical model underpinned the details of festivals and rituals). 

Initiation into the substratum, or even slight knowledge of its existence and content, would, for the Greeks, inform life, art and belief in an extraordinary way: it would be amplified and vivified in proportion to the degree of understanding of the ideas involved in the cultural apparatus. Most Greeks were however uninformed about the real nature of their culture’s theological background, but they nevertheless had a grasp of some of the consequential details, without understanding their origin in the depths of a complex and (in certain senses)  unified body of  discursive ideas about the divine.


The intellectual basis of Greek Theology

If the ultimate ground of reality is as revealed (essentially negatively) in Plato’s dialogues, and in the Enneads of Plotinus, then a number of  fairly obvious logical inferences will be made.

Firstly, this ultimate ground of reality is the principal subject of religious awe, honour and worship. Other entities may have a claim on priestly worship, but only in so far as they participate in the ultimate ground of reality. However, much of the imagery, conception and narrative in religion is accidental rather than essential, in that it arises in response to human credulity, vanity, and political requirements. Religious establishments pay a price for their existence in the world, and paying honour to accidental divinities is part of that price. Creating them (even setting them up in heaven, which a skill of the theurgists)  is another part of that price.

Secondly, the nature of the model in which the ultimate ground of reality is the complete collapse of not only the categories of perception, but also the ultimate ontological collapse of the categories of reality and existence, means that the ground of reality is, despite appearances, immanent to all things, whether abstract or concrete.The ultimate ground of reality can be emulated and invoked; can be summoned, and made near.

Thirdly, it follows that contact with the ultimate ground of reality is a matter of apprehension and understanding – a matter of ontological models and ontological nous: of knowing, and knowing what you are doing.

Fourthly, for the foregoing reasons, it is immensely important that the ultimate ground of reality be recalled and invoked to the greatest degree by the wise, and be made proximate in the world to the utmost. Not as a merely pious observance, but as a vital part of religious activity. The arguments leading up to the insight that the ultimate reality is a place which transcends the logic and order of the physical world, where things which happen seem to be impossible within the logic of that physical world as explored within the Platonic dialogues (motion and change), mean that the ultimate ground of reality makes difficult or even impossible things possible. Contact and transaction with that ground of reality is therefore imperative if temporal power of any kind is desired.


Magic and Ontology in Ancient Greece

Numerous theories of magic have been given some kind of life since the late nineteenth century. The one which has had the most influence is of course Frazer’s theory of sympathetic and contagious magic. It is not clear from The Golden Bough in which the theory is described that other possibilities have been discarded. However other possibilities have been discarded. Wittgenstein objected to Frazer’s general picture of ancient society on the grounds that it made ancient man stupid; unable to make distinctions between fallacious notions and plausible ones, which are  (as we think) relatively easy for us to make. 

In Frazer’s prize-winning late nineteenth-century essay on the development of Plato’s theory of Ideas, it is clear why other possibilities are not considered: for Frazer Plato’s ontology is merely a projection of subjective categories, and not in any way a proper apprehension of reality. The reason for this judgement is that Plato is not concerned with the same realities as Frazer – i.e, epistemological questions about the physical reality which is the concern of the scientific and technical enterprise of the late nineteenth century (he makes this view explicit). Plato’s ontology is about what Plato considered (subjectively) important, and is not subject to falsification. Frazer as a consequence did not consider the Parmenides to be an important dialogue from the point of view of understanding Plato’s philosophy, and considered that many of the questions discussed in that dialogue (and elsewhere), were merely ‘popular questions of the day’.

There is some truth in the proposition that Plato’s ontology is not subject to falsification. If Plato’s ontology is erected on the basis of an earthbound logic applied to abstract questions, rather than observation and experiment, then it cannot be subject to falsifcation in any strictly scientific sense. But we are not concerned here with a scientifc sense of falsification, but rather a logical one. The ontology  (essentially a theory of Being) which emerges from the dialogues of Plato is expressly an ontology which is apart from any human and earthbound interest – it may be about ‘the Good’, but that ‘Good’ is not necessarily good in any terms a human being can easily understand. This ontology does not feed any human, subjective and pre-existing model of reality – instead (to the consternation of scholars looking for a purely pedagogical purpose to the Platonic dialogues) it violates it to the maximum degree. The arguments explored in the course of the dialogues often destroy the validity of views and opinions which seem to be plain common sense.  The logic used to reach these positions necessarily invalidates itself in the course of argument, and the nature of the ultimate reality 'established' as a result of these arguments expressly violates any subjective and pre-existing ontology in the mind of the inquirer. Therefore the charge that Plato confounded a subjective ontology with an objective one is unfounded.

As for the Frazerian theory of magic, which he seemed to think was applicable to the ancient world as well as to the ’savages’ who peopled nineteenth century anthropology, it is expressly based on Locke’s seventeenth century theory of the association of ideas (Frazer’s world view was thoroughly enlightenment and Lockean)  – it presumes the absence of  a model of reality based on an ontology which has a theory of Being as its core. It is an appropriate theory therefore if the the notion that Plato was dealing in theology is imaginary.  However if the Platonic theology is not imaginary, then the Frazerian theory of sympathetic and contagious magic is not appropriate for an analysis of the world of ideas in Greek antiquity.
Magic outside the world of the credulous depends for its possibility and efficacy on an ontology which makes participation possible. We do not have to accept this logic, but it is important to understand that magical relationships between things were considered to be a consequence of the ontology which supports participation between things which are separate at the level of physicality. Magic may be practiced by those who know little or nothing of the ontology which gives the practice plausibility and its logic. However those who know of the basis of the logic in the ontology have greater power because they know what they are doing (cf Plato’s remarks on magic performed by prophets and diviners in the Laws).

In the Renaissance those who were enthused by the writings of Plato understood there to be an ontological basis to the principles of association between objects, and presumed that this was understood by the Greeks. This has been seen to be implicit in the texts of the dialogues at various times in the history of their critical interpretation. Almost none of the contemporary academic discussions of the ancient world depends on the existence of an ancient ontology which is based on a sophisticated theory of Being.

The study of the thought of the ancient world requires that our understanding of ancient theology and ontology is clarified, so that we understand that, whatever Plato or other authors may say, we should not presume that they are making the kind of mistake which Frazer and his successors suggested that they made. The ancient ontology may be faulty, but whatever might be wrong with it, plain stupidity is not the souce of the fault.

In attempting to understand the subtle distinctions between the varieties of religious ritual, craft and art, and understand where an action, statement, formula or construction is shaped by an ontology and its understanding rather than some other cause, we might follow Aristotle in looking at the cultural production of the past in terms of four separable causes – the ontological (or final cause), the efficient, the formal and the material. Cultural productions which depend on a theory of Being are productions which are those produced in the context of an ontological theory, and an understanding of that theory. It matters little whether that understanding is accurate and well-informed or not – what we are looking for is the tell-tale signs in the production which mark these items as evidence of a contextual theory of Being. 

It is however quite common for these tell-tale signs to appear in periods where there may be no understanding of ontology at all – in which case the physical evidence tells only something about the intellectual history of its origins. For the understanding of the intellectual stature of those times, other evidence is necessary.


Beyond Motion and Change 

The theology which makes participation a vital part of the universe (since the One gave rise to the Many) also in some of its arguments suggests participation (and motion and change) to be impossible (cf. the argument in the Sophist about whether or not forms may participate if they are unchanging). At a certain point in the development of theological ideas, therefore, a premium would be placed on the devising and isolation of methods in which participation with the ultimate ground of reality would be maximised without motion and change. In other words, importance would be placed on the development of techniques to make participation efficacious which did not depend on motion and change - two things which appeared to be illusory. Hence the ideas of completion and perfection became central to religious practice.

 The ideas of completion, perfection, limit, and end were closely associated. They were however not the same, though they could, according to standard practice in ancient Greece as elsewhere in the ancient world, stand in for each other metonomously, or metaphorically. Participation was made emphatic by achievement of these states. As Aristotle wrote, each end is the thing for which its component parts exist. There are many ends for which things exist, but there is one ultimate end for which all exists (Plato made this idea explicit by saying that ‘you exist for the end, and not the end for you’). By extension, it is clear that the lesser ends exist for the final end of all things (the Good, or the ultimate ground of reality). Each end has characteristics in common with the ultimate ground of reality, and this is a mode of participation with that ground.  Thus, the limit of a thing, or the reaching of its end, or the completion of an action, or the achievement of a perfect excellence in anything is in effect, within the ontological model which depends on a theory of Being, the opening of a high-road to the ultimate ground of reality.

This is suggestive of a deep-seated unity behind a number of disparate phenomena. Excellence, declared by Aristotle to be something performed for its own sake, now has a clearer rationale (one which was always implicit in the Ethics where he makes clear that the highest virtue is contemplation, which makes men like the gods – at least according to the argument of his book). An excellence performed is implicitly performed for the most perfect excellence, and can be seen as an act significant in the context of a theory of Being. A property of the transcendent end is emulated by the performance of the excellence, and a bond is thereby established. Excellence has an explicit theological context to Aristotle, and is not confined to the secular world.

This leads us to the idea of ‘binding’ as it was understood at the time of Ficino’s revival of Platonism. Several concepts cluster around this idea, which is closely related to the ideas of participation and joining, and ‘harmonia’. Binding is the act of  opening a connection with the ultimate ground of reality through the establishment of a mode of participation, and by so doing, the agent of the action enters territory where possibility of thought and action are magnified. This can be achieved in a number of ways, including the precise performance of an appropriate ritual, the performance of an appropriate sacrifice - at the appropriate time, for the appropriate reason, and to the appropriate divinity (amplified by multiplicity of sacrifice, or by a more acceptable victim), the correct and complete recital of a liturgy, the consultation of an oracle, the honouring and worship of a god according to the proper styling (the god having a special kind of completion as a an attribute). The correct and appropriate distribution of the shares in the sacrificial animals among the community is also the performance of a special (as opposed to the ultimate) excellence.

The act of sacrifice itself represents the act of ‘binding’ within the ontological model. That is, whereas it has been presumed that the act of sacrifice is to be interpreted as an act of giving to the god, and receiving in terms of the distribution of the parts of the body of the sacrificial animal (as it must have been interpreted by those not privy to the ontological justification in antiquity), in fact it can be understood as a form of completion given to the animal at the crucial moment of slaughter.